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 Abstract 
Organisms encode rewarding and aversive experiences through reinforcement learning, 
capitalizing on prediction errors (PEs), which adapt action strategies over time. Computational 
theories are explicit that PE signals should update action weights continuously over the course 
of a behavioral task, an important time-dependent variation that is eschewed in traditional 
neuroscience studies that average over large numbers of trials. I examined variation in reaction 
times and feedback-locked cortical activity over time as a function of PE to critically examine 
theories indicating that PE signals drive time-dependent learning. We recorded EEG while 
participants completed a novel reinforcement task that varied prediction error on a trial-by-trial 
basis. I applied a computational framework that modeled reaction time changes over the task as 
a function of prediction error and time. In positive reinforcement conditions, reaction times 
improved over the course of the task regardless of the PE. For negative reinforcement, learning 
effects were moderated by PE. For better than expected outcomes, more positive prediction 
errors (further from expectation) drove faster reaction times over the course of the task, and for 
worse than expected outcomes, more negative prediction errors (further from expectation) drove 
faster reaction times over the course of the task. Behavioral analyses were supplemented by 
single-trial robust regression of feedback-locked EEG. The feedback-related negativity (FRN), a 
mediofrontal ERP component thought to convey a PE signal, showed robust changes in 
activation over time but did not respond to trial-by-trial magnitude of prediction errors. This time-
dependent change was evident only for reward delivery and aversive stimulus delivery, which 
represent on average the most salient outcomes in the task. Mediofrontal brain activity during 
this same time window and at the same scalp location drove subsequent reaction time 
improvements over the course of the task following aversive stimulus delivery. I suggest that the 
standard approach of examining the ERP as an average across conditions obscures important 
adaptation effects of the FRN that reflect reinforcement learning as outcomes are learned. 
 
 Acknowledgments 
First and foremost, I must express my sincerest gratitude to my advisor Dr. Connie Lamm for 
her constant support, patience, and guidance over the five years I have been a doctoral student 
in her lab. Through her support I learned to critically examine existing theories on the science of 
the brain, how to craft and defend an argument, and how to think like a scientist. Her guidance 
has been invaluable to me throughout my graduate career, and without her careful supervision I 
would not be in the position I am to pursue my long-term career goals. 
 
I also must thank my colleague, coauthor, and teacher, Dr. Vladimir Miskovic, for his careful 
attention and efforts on the several manuscripts he has helped me to prepare for publication. 
 
I would also like to thank Dr. Jenn Veilleux and Dr. Douglas Rhoads for serving on my 
dissertation committee. I am grateful for their support that has motivated me and enabled me to 
complete my dissertation. I am grateful to Dr. Nathan Parks as well for serving on my 
candidature committee.  
 
Finally, a special thanks is deserved by the many students in Dr. Connie Lamm’s 
Developmental, Cognitive, and Affective Psychophysiology Laboratory for their invaluable 
assistance in collecting the data this dissertation is built from. Special among this group are (in 
alphabetical order): Carroll Bentley, Zachary Levy, Stephanie Long, Morgan Middlebrooks, 
Danielle Smith, Josh Upshaw, and Summer Webers, for supervising data collection sessions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table of Contents 
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Computational perspectives on reinforcement learning ................................................ 1 
1.2 Dopamine implicated in reinforcement learning through PE signals ............................ 4 
1.3 Dopamine value PE coding in VTA neurons ................................................................. 5 
1.4 Dopamine salience PE coding in VTA neurons ............................................................ 6 
1.5 PE signals in dopamine release in nucleus accumbens ............................................... 7 
1.6 PE signals in dopamine release in prefrontal cortex ..................................................... 9 
1.7 Imaging Studies of PE Signaling in Humans .............................................................. 11 
1.8 Electrophysiological Studies of PE Signaling in Humans ........................................... 14 
1.9 The Neglected Role of Time in Dopamine Reinforcement Signaling .......................... 17 
1.10 Current study: prefrontal cortical modulation of learning ............................................ 20 
1.10 Hypotheses ................................................................................................................. 21 
1.11 Importance and theoretical impact of proposed study ................................................ 22 
2 Methods .............................................................................................................................. 23 
2.1 Participants ................................................................................................................. 23 
2.2 Reinforcement learning task ....................................................................................... 24 
2.2 EEG processing .......................................................................................................... 26 
2.3 Conventional trial-averaged analyses ......................................................................... 27 
2.4 Single-trial analysis ..................................................................................................... 28 
3 Results ................................................................................................................................ 32 
3.1  Conventional (trial-averaged) results .......................................................................... 32 
3.2 Single-Trial analysis of brain and behavior ................................................................. 35 
4 Discussion .......................................................................................................................... 44 
4.1 Comparison of Results to Standard ERP Studies of Reinforcement .......................... 44 
 4.2 Single-Trial Analysis of Reinforcement Learning ........................................................ 51 
4.3 Limitations of the Current Study ................................................................................. 56 
4.4 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 57 
5 References ......................................................................................................................... 59 
6 Appendices ......................................................................................................................... 65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 List of Figures 
Figure 1. Comparison of Value and Salience Prediction Errors. .................................................. 3 
Figure 2. Task diagram for the modified reinforcement flanker paradigm .................................. 26 
Figure 3. Regression model diagram for the reinforcement task ............................................... 30 
Figure 4. Trial averaged reaction times ...................................................................................... 33 
Figure 5. Graphical depiction of traditional ERP results ............................................................. 34 
Figure 6. Single-trial reaction time analysis ................................................................................ 37 
Figure 7. Single-trial ERP regression results ............................................................................. 39 
Figure 8. ANOVA testing of single-trial regressions ................................................................... 40 
Figure 9. Post hoc testing of single-trial ANOVAs ...................................................................... 42 
Figure 10. Single-trial brain-RT regression results ..................................................................... 43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
1 Introduction  
1.1 Computational perspectives on reinforcement learning 
Through our interactions with the environment around us, we learn about the causes and 
effects of our actions, as well as what actions we should take in the future to maximize positive 
outcomes. The term reinforcement was first introduced by Pavlov (1903) to describe the 
associative pairing of a conditioned predictor stimulus with an unconditioned reinforcing 
stimulus. This initial conception used reinforcement to describe stimulus-stimulus learning, that 
is, to describe how an organism learns to associate a non-reward stimulus with a reward 
stimulus. The term has since become used more often to describe stimulus-response learning; 
that is, how an organism learns to associate an environmental stimulus with a behavioral 
response. The strength of stimulus-response associations depends on which responses most 
often lead to desired outcomes. This concept was described in Thorndike’s (1905) law of effect, 
which suggested that responses which are followed by reward will be more strongly associated 
with the environmental situation that spurred them. When that situation re-occurs, a response 
which was closely followed by reward will be more likely to re-occur. 
From a computational perspective, the reinforcement learning problem must map 
environmental situations onto those behaviors that maximize positive outcomes and minimize 
negative outcomes (Sutton & Barto, 1998). In computational approaches to reinforcement 
learning, a key concept revolves around the prediction error term (PE). The PE term represents 
the deviation of outcomes from expectations, guiding optimal learning from environmental 
occurrences. A large PE term indexes an outcome that was far from the prediction. This should 
spur changes in future action strategies, in order to bring future outcomes more in line with 
predictions. Likewise, a small or nonexistent PE term indexes outcomes that were properly 
predicted; this should translate to slower or no learning rates when outcomes are close to what 
was expected. One classic model of reinforcement learning is the Rescorla-Wagner model 
(Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). In this model, a stronger association between stimuli means that 
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one stimulus predicts the other (i.e. low prediction error) and a weaker association means that 
one stimulus does not accurately predict the other (i.e. high prediction error). This model 
conceives of associations as carrying a signed value – specifically, if a stimulus predicts a 
reward, it carries a positive association, and if a stimulus predicts an aversive outcome it carries 
a negative association. Therefore, the prediction error term in the Rescorla-Wagner model 
carries information about how strongly a stimulus predicts an outcome, as well as whether the 
stimulus predicts a better-than-expected or worse-than-expected outcome. This type of PE term 
is called either a signed or value PE. These terminologies will be used interchangeably in this 
review. 
The Pearce-Hall error learning model (Pearce & Hall, 1980), like the Rescorla-Wagner 
model, conceived of learning in terms of associations between conditioned and unconditioned 
stimuli. However, the prediction error term in this model takes a different approach to that of the 
Rescorla-Wagner model. In the Pearce-Hall implementation, the strength of association 
between the unconditioned stimulus and the conditioned stimulus depends on the attention paid 
to the conditioned stimulus. Since both rewarding and aversive events are attention-grabbing, 
the PE term in this model does not explicitly code for whether an outcome was better or worse 
than expected. Instead, outcomes which are both salient (better-than-expected or worse-than-
expected) and unexpected are associated more strongly with the predictive stimulus. This type 
of prediction error is called either an unsigned or salience PE. These terminologies are used 
interchangeably in the remainder of this review. 
Previous theoretical perspectives on reinforcement learning suggest that the most 
important computational term underlying learning is the prediction error term (Glascher, Daw, 
Dayan, & O’Doherty, 2010; Glimcher, 2011; Pearce & Hall, 1980; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; 
Sutton & Barto, 1998). However, theories have disagreed on the exact form this term should 
take. The Rescorla-Wagner model suggested that the PE term would follow a value function, 
that linearly increased with increasing reward value and decreased for increasingly aversive 
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stimuli (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). The Pearce-Hall error learning model instead used a 
salience function for the prediction error term, which increased with increasing salience of 
rewards or punishments but was agnostic to the “value” (good or bad) of the outcome (Pearce & 
Hall, 1980). See Figure 1 for a depiction of signed vs. unsigned prediction error signaling.  
 
 
Figure 1. Comparison of Signed (“Value”) and unsigned (“Salience”) Prediction Errors. The main 
difference is in how the terms behave when outcomes are worse than expected (O < E); a 
signed prediction error will decrease with worse outcomes, whereas an unsigned prediction 
error will scale with increasing salience regardless of the value of an outcome. From Rawls et 
al. (under review). 
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A third class of models, temporal difference (TD; Sutton & Barto, 1987; Sutton, 1988) 
models, provide an encompassing theory and computational approach to studying how past 
outcomes are integrated in learning stimulus-response associations. TD models posit that both 
the subjective “value” of outcomes and the subjective “salience” of outcomes are critical in 
determining learning. Outcomes with positive value will stimulate approach behavior and 
outcomes with negative value will stimulate avoidance behavior. Meanwhile, outcomes with 
higher salience (better-than-expected or worse-than-expected) will result in more rapid 
alteration of associative weights, thereby speeding learning. This perspective on reinforcement 
learning does not assume importance of only a value or salience PE, but instead point to the 
importance of both terms in determining reinforcement learning outcomes. Most importantly, 
and most neglected in the current literature, is the implicit notion that the signaling of PEs 
should change over time as outcomes and task contingencies are learned. 
1.2 Dopamine implicated in reinforcement learning through PE signals 
There is substantial disagreement in neuroscience literature about how reinforcement 
learning computations, and in particular PE terms, are reflected in neural architecture. Most 
discussion around the neural implementation of reinforcement learning posits that dopamine is a 
key factor in representing the reinforcing properties of outcomes with regard to expectations. 
There are two main regions in the brain where dopamine cell bodies reside – the ventral 
tegmental area (VTA) and the substantia nigra pars compacta (SN). These pathways 
differentially contribute to the main functions of dopamine in the brain. The dopamine system 
originating in the substantia nigra modulates many of the motor functions of dopamine, while the 
dopamine system originating in the VTA modulates the reinforcing impacts of dopamine. 
Therefore, I will focus on the VTA dopamine system. The primary dopaminergic projections of 
the VTA are the mesocortical and mesolimbic pathways, which transmit to the prefrontal and 
motor cortices, and the nucleus accumbens, respectively. These dopaminergic pathways play 
an important role in reinforcement learning. In particular, dopaminergic signals might convey 
 5 
prediction error signals in the brain. Sparse VTA dopaminergic projections also reach the 
amygdala and the hippocampus, which are implicated in emotional modulation of reinforcement 
and memory of reinforcement, respectively. In our review of the mesolimbic reward system, I will 
primarily focus on dopaminergic projections from VTA to NAcc, in line with most reinforcement 
literature. 
1.3 Dopamine value PE coding in VTA neurons 
Early research on dopamine in reinforcement suggested that dopamine neurons 
encoded a value (signed) prediction error (Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997; Hollerman & 
Schultz, 1998). This study recorded firing rates of dopamine neurons in the macaque midbrain 
during delivery of expected reward, omission of expected reward, and delivery of unexpected 
reward. Results indicated that dopamine firing rates closely approximated what would be 
expected of a value prediction error signal. Specifically, firing rate increased from baseline for 
unexpected reward delivery (reward > expectation), firing rate remained at baseline for 
expected reward delivery (reward = expectation), and firing rate fell below baseline for 
unexpected reward omission (reward < expectation). This result has since been replicated many 
times and is one of the mainstays in reinforcement research. 
Steinberg, Keiflin, Boivin, Witten, Deisseroth, & Janak (2013) causally inferred the link 
between positive reward prediction error signals in dopaminergic neurons and reward learning 
using optogenetic techniques. This experiment used a blocking procedure, in which a novel cue 
is co-presented with a preconditioned cue that predicted reward. Usually, this would not result in 
the organism learning to associate reward with the novel cue. However, when VTA dopamine 
neurons were stimulated while the cue stimuli were presented, this caused rats to learn to 
associate reward with the novel stimulus. This provides causal evidence that mimicking a 
positive prediction error in VTA causes associative learning that would normally be blocked. 
Importantly, this study only investigated whether a positive prediction error (simulating better 
than expected outcomes by increasing dopamine firing in VTA) drove reinforcement learning.  
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Dopamine neurons have a very low basal spike output, meaning that negative reward 
prediction errors cannot slow dopamine output very much. For this reason, negative reward 
prediction error signaling might not have the same causal behavioral effects as positive reward 
prediction error signaling, due to a lack of variance in the signal. To examine whether this is the 
case, Chang, Esher, Marrero-Garcia, Yau, Bonci, & Schoenbaum (2016) conditioned rats to 
associate one pellet of food reward with two separate cues. In this over-expectation procedure, 
the subsequent co-presentation of both cues at once causes the rat to expect two food pellets of 
reward (one for each conditioned stimulus). If only one food pellet is then given, a negative 
prediction error is generated, which would lower associative value of both predictive stimuli. 
However, Chang et al. (2016) presented two food pellets (no prediction error), while instead 
simulating a negative prediction error by optogenetically silencing dopamine neurons in VTA. 
Although the expected reward was delivered, therefore generating no prediction error, follow-up 
testing demonstrated a reduced ability of the conditioned stimuli to generate motivated 
responses, as though the rat had received a lesser reward than expected. Therefore, even 
though the outcome did not generate a prediction error, simulation of a negative prediction error 
by silencing output of VTA dopaminergic neurons was sufficient to decrease associative weight. 
1.4 Dopamine salience PE coding in VTA neurons 
Since the initial discovery that dopamine indexed a signed prediction error-like signal 
(Schulz et al., 1997), further research has indicated that this interpretation is far from clear-cut. 
While Schulz et al. (1997) and Hollerman and Schultz (1998) initial sets of findings indicated 
that dopamine neurons convey signed prediction errors, this interpretation is hard to reconcile 
with evidence that dopamine neurons in VTA respond to a multitude of potentially important 
stimuli. For example, it has been known for decades that VTA dopaminergic neurons respond to 
unconditioned sensory stimuli in both auditory and visual modalities (Chiodo, Antelman, 
Caggiula, & Lineberry, 1980; Horvitz, Stewart, & Jacobs, 1997). Furthermore, the finding that 
aversive stimuli increase phasic activation of VTA dopamine neurons has been replicated 
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numerous times (Brischoux, Chakraborty, Brierley, & Ungless, 2009; Guarraci & Kapp, 1999; 
Mantz, Thierry, & Glowinski, 1989; Matsumoto & Hikosaka, 2009). Thus, if dopaminergic 
prediction errors encode only linear, value-based prediction errors, then a dopamine increase 
for noxious stimuli is perplexing.  
There is mounting evidence that dopamine neurons convey different signals depending 
on anatomical location. Brischoux, Chakraborty, Brierley, & Ungless (2009) investigated this 
issue further, and found that separate dopamine neurons seemed to respond to aversive and 
rewarding stimuli within the VTA. Specifically, these results showed that neurons in the ventral 
portion of VTA were excited by foot shock, while neurons in the dorsal VTA were inhibited by 
foot shock. This suggests that neurons in ventral portions of VTA might code for outcome 
salience over value (since a foot shock is salient but not valuable). A portion of the neurons that 
were unresponsive to or inhibited by foot shock were excited by release of (escape from) foot 
shock. This shows that these neurons meet theoretical criteria for a value PE signal for aversive 
stimuli, since escape or release from a noxious stimulus is reinforcing. Aversive stimuli therefore 
discriminate neurons in the VTA which signal a value PE from those that signal a salience PE. 
This suggests that there might be separate populations of dopamine neurons conveying signed 
and unsigned PEs in the brain (Hikosaka & Matsumoto, 2009). Some recent evidence even 
indicates that individual dopamine neurons might convey both salience and value PEs at 
different time-scales. In a recent review Schultz (2016) suggested that dopamine neurons might 
convey a rapid salience signal, followed by a more gradual value signal. 
1.5 PE signals in dopamine release in nucleus accumbens 
One way to tease apart the neural pathway-specific mechanisms by which dopamine 
impacts reinforcement is through careful examination of dopamine release in downstream 
targets of VTA dopamine cell bodies. The main target of dopaminergic projections from the VTA 
in the mesolimbic pathway, colloquially known as the “reward pathway,” is the nucleus 
accumbens (NAcc). The nucleus accumbens is comprised of two main regions, the core and the 
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shell. Hart, Rutledge, Glimcher, & Phillips (2014) used fast-scan cyclic voltammetry (an invasive 
real-time electricity-based method to measure neurotransmitter concentration) in combination 
with principal components analysis (PCA) to assess reward-evoked real-time dopamine release 
in rat nucleus accumbens. They concluded that a principal component of dopamine release in 
the rat nucleus accumbens follows a bidirectional value signal, coding symmetrically for 
negative and positive signed PEs. This study also identified an earlier principal component of 
dopamine release in NAcc that did not satisfy requirements of a signed PE. The authors 
suggested that this component might correspond to an early indicator of salience, perhaps a 
response to a compound stimulus predicting the end of the waiting period and the beginning of 
the reward period. Importantly, this early dopamine component seems to correspond to the 
early, nondiscriminant activity of dopamine neurons described in Schulz (2016), suggesting that 
both early and late phasic responses of dopamine neurons are accurately reflected in separable 
principal components of NAcc dopamine release, and that NAcc dopamine release might 
encode an early salience signal followed by a later value signal. 
Different regions of the nucleus accumbens might differentially encode reinforcing or 
salient aspects of stimuli. Budygin, Park, Bass, Grinevich, Bonin, and Wightman (2012) used 
fast-scan cyclic voltammetry to assess real-time dopamine release in regions of the rat midbrain 
during processing of aversive stimuli. This study showed that tail pinch (an aversive stimulus 
commonly used in rat research) resulted in fast increases in dopamine concentration in nucleus 
accumbens core but did not change dopamine concentrations in nucleus accumbens shell. 
Meanwhile, release of tail pinch rapidly increased dopamine concentrations in nucleus 
accumbens shell. Therefore, core dopamine concentrations seem to encode delivery of aversive 
stimuli, while shell regions seem to code for negative reinforcement due to escape from 
aversive stimuli. This result is supported by Wightman et al. (2007) in a study in which rats were 
conditioned to fear a tone. Tone presentation decreased dopamine release in the core region, 
but increased dopamine transmission in the shell region. Since the unconditioned stimulus (foot 
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shock) was not presented, the authors suggested that increases in dopamine concentration in 
the NAcc shell region might code for negative reinforcement due to successful avoidance of 
aversive outcomes. This is consistent with a signed dopaminergic PE signal in NAcc shell. 
However, dopamine release in the NAcc core increases for several different forms of negative 
stimuli in the manner expected of a salience signal. The increase in DA release for aversive 
stimuli seems to facilitate active avoidance behavior. Olesen, Gentry, Chioma, & Cheer (2012) 
measured real-time dopamine release in NAcc core during an active avoidance paradigm. The 
authors found increases in accumbal dopamine release prior to successful avoidance, which 
seems linked to dopamine increases signaling the potential to avoid aversive stimuli. Accumbal 
dopamine release decreased prior to unsuccessful avoidance responses, which the authors 
linked to decreases in dopamine release signaling delivery of aversive stimuli. Based on these 
results, dopamine release seems to carry different information content in the nucleus 
accumbens core vs. shell. Specifically, dopamine release in the shell of the nucleus accumbens 
seems to carry a traditional dopaminergic value PE, while dopamine release in the core of the 
nucleus accumbens instead seems to carry a dopaminergic salience signal. 
1.6 PE signals in dopamine release in prefrontal cortex 
A separate group of dopaminergic cell bodies project from the VTA to the prefrontal 
cortex, forming the mesocortical dopamine pathway. Critically, these neurons differ in many 
functional properties from more conventional dopamine neurons. Conventional dopamine 
neurons exhibit broad action potentials (action potentials occur over a relatively long period of 
time), low frequency tonic spiking with high-frequency burst firing capacity, and strong post-
inhibitory rebound spiking (cells spike when inhibition is released, without need for additional 
excitation). Lammel, Hetzel, Hackel, Jones, Liss, & Roeper (2008) demonstrated that, contrary 
to prior belief, only neurons in the dorsolateral VTA projecting to the nucleus accumbens shell 
displayed these conventional properties of dopamine cells. Using these conventional properties 
to define dopamine cells might have led to an oversampling of dopamine neurons projecting to 
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the nucleus accumbens shell in past studies of prediction error signaling. Importantly, dopamine 
release in the nucleus accumbens shell seems to display a signed dopaminergic PE, in line with 
many studies which have observed signed PE signaling in groups of dopamine neurons 
selected using conventional electrophysiological properties. 
In contrast, Lammel et al. (2008) showed that dopamine neurons in ventromedial regions 
of the VTA, projecting to medial prefrontal cortex and nucleus accumbens core, have very 
different features. More specifically, these neurons do not show the conventional criteria and 
therefore may not have been selected in previous studies examining prediction errors. These 
neurons fire persistently at much higher frequencies than conventional dopamine neurons and 
can be effectively silenced by inhibition (that is, these neurons do not exhibit post-inhibitory 
rebound spiking). In contrast, inhibition does not silence conventional dorsolateral VTA 
dopamine neurons, which exhibit strong post-inhibitory rebound properties. Furthermore, 
dopamine neurons respond to reinforcement in different ways, depending on where they project 
to. Lammel, Ion, Roeper, & Malenka (2011) showed that rewarding events change excitatory 
strength of dopamine neurons projecting to nucleus accumbens shell, but not those projecting to 
prefrontal cortex. In contrast, aversive stimuli changed the excitatory weights of dopamine 
neurons projecting to prefrontal cortex. These results suggest that a population of conventional 
dopamine neurons, which are likely overrepresented in studies of dopamine signaling, project to 
the nucleus accumbens shell and carry a signed prediction error signal. Meanwhile, populations 
of unconventional dopamine neurons project to the nucleus accumbens core and prefrontal 
cortex, and carry salient, primarily aversive, information. This distinction was shown 
experimentally for the first time by Lammel et al. (2012). Optogenetic stimulation of dopamine 
neurons projecting to nucleus accumbens shell induced conditioned place preference, while 
optogenetic stimulation of dopamine neurons projecting to prefrontal cortex induced conditioned 
place aversion. This study causally implicated separate populations of dopamine neurons in the 
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control of reward and aversion signaling, mediated by signed and unsigned prediction error 
signals respectively. 
Traditionally, dopamine neurons have been selected using a priori identified 
conventional criteria. Recent evidence suggests that these properties are only true of a distinct 
population of dopamine neurons projecting to the nucleus accumbens shell. Importantly, these 
studies have generally identified selected dopamine neurons as carrying a value PE, and 
dopamine release patterns in the nucleus accumbens shell are largely reflective of a value PE 
as well. However, populations of dopamine cells exhibiting less conventional properties 
preferentially project to the nucleus accumbens core and prefrontal cortex. Critically, these 
neurons are excited by aversive stimuli and produce strong conditioned place aversions when 
optogenetically stimulated. This suggests that the population of dopamine neurons projecting to 
prefrontal cortex does not encode value PEs, but instead is maximally sensitive to salient 
(primarily aversive) stimuli. Furthermore, the lack of post-inhibitory rebound in this population of 
dopamine cells suggests that these neurons can be effectively silenced by inhibition. Inhibitory 
GABAergic drive from prefrontal neurons might therefore be capable of inhibiting mesocortical 
dopamine output, therefore exerting top-down control over aversive learning.  
1.7 Imaging Studies of PE Signaling in Humans 
Research methods used in functioning human brains are limited by the need to be non-
invasive and must be augmented using animal studies to draw neurobiologically relevant 
conclusions. For example, direct subsecond measure of dopamine release in the human brain 
cannot be assessed. Furthermore, electrical recording of human subcortical brain activity is 
impossible, except for certain patient populations with implanted recording electrodes. Despite 
these shortcomings, investigating the signaling of prediction errors in human brain activity is 
essential for an algorithmic understanding of human reinforcement learning. Here I review fMRI 
studies of subcortical and cortical oxygenated blood flow, which correlates strongly with neural 
activity in specific brain regions. 
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While research has identified human BOLD activity during reward anticipation and 
delivery (Knutson, Adams, Fong, & Hommer, 2001; Knutson & Cooper, 2005), targeting 
individual brainstem nuclei such as the VTA is a difficult proposition in fMRI research. The VTA 
is the size of a mere two (2) voxels using standard 3T fMRI acquisition templates. In one of the 
first investigations to successfully target human brainstem nuclei (VTA) using 3T fMRI, 
D’Ardenne, McClure, Nystrom, & Cohen (2008) imaged BOLD responses in the VTA during 
reinforcement processing. This study did not use high-field fMRI to acquire high-resolution 
images but instead made clever changes to image acquisition routines that allowed VTA 
imaging, including taking oblique slices that were chosen to include as much of the brainstem as 
possible, using altered normalization routines that have been shown to work better than normal 
routines for small brainstem nuclei, and coupling the pulse sequence to the subject’s heart rate 
to minimize movement artifact from nearby blood vessels. This study showed that the BOLD 
response in VTA was significantly modulated by positive reward prediction errors, but not 
negative reward prediction errors. Therefore, oxygenated blood flow increased for rewards 
greater than expected, but did not decrease from baseline for rewards that were lower than 
expected. The authors note that this likely reflects the “restriction of range” issue noted above – 
most dopamine neurons in VTA fire at such low basal levels that a decrease from baseline is 
not detectable. This study did not identify any VTA correlate of negative reward prediction 
errors, or any VTA response to aversive events. The authors suggest that the number of cells in 
VTA signaling aversive events (approximately 30%) does not cause enough change in BOLD 
signal to be detected by fMRI imaging. Schott et al. (2008) conducted an innovative study 
examined fMRI imaging of brain activity and PET imaging of [11C]raclopride (a dopamine 
receptor agonist that is displaced by dopamine binding) displacement in human nucleus 
accumbens during reward anticipation. Therefore, this study measured oxygenated blood flow in 
VTA and dopamine binding in NAcc. Note that these two sessions were necessarily conducted 
separately. Furthermore, because of the slow dynamics of [11C]raclopride binding and 
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displacement, this study was unable to examine real-time dopamine binding dynamics. 
However, VTA activity correlated positively with decrease in [11C]raclopride binding in nucleus 
accumbens, suggesting that the same neural mechanisms underlying VTA/NAcc interactions in 
animal models are observable in human brain imaging studies. 
fMRI studies examining negative or aversive prediction errors have largely supported 
evidence from animal models. Seymour et al. (2005) examined appetitive and aversive signaling 
using a negative reinforcement task. As predicted based on rat models, avoidance of pain gave 
rise to a positive prediction error-like signal in midbrain striatal regions. Furthermore, delivery of 
aversive stimuli resulted in a negative prediction error-like signal in orbitofrontal and anterior 
cingulate cortices. This corresponds to previous animal evidence in suggesting that mesolimbic 
dopamine projections from VTA might carry positive prediction error information to striatum, 
while mesocortical dopamine projections might carry negative or aversive prediction error 
signals to prefrontal cortex. As further support of this theory, Metereau & Dreher (2012) showed 
that activity in human ACC and anterior insula covaried with a salience prediction error rather 
than a value prediction error using appetitive and aversive juice. This pattern was confirmed in a 
recent meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies. Garrison, Erdeniz, & Done (2013) used activation 
likelihood analysis to examine studies of human prediction error signaling. This study showed 
that positive (reward) prediction errors was largely confined to striatal areas, as expected based 
on the anatomy of the brain mesolimbic dopamine pathway (e.g., NAcc shell). Furthermore, 
negative (aversive) prediction errors were largely associated with activity in prefrontal cortex 
and habenula (which projects to ventral VTA and carries information about aversive events). 
Numerous fMRI studies have implicated striatal BOLD signaling in reward prediction 
error signaling in the human brain. Most of these studies do not have sufficient spatial resolution 
to image individual subcortical nuclei. However, these findings generally agree in showing 
subcortical BOLD increase in line with a value prediction error, as expected based on previous 
evidence from rat brain studies (NAcc core). Furthermore, human prefrontal cortex oxygenated 
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blood flow is strongly related to aversive stimuli and reflects negative prediction errors. These 
findings agree with previous animal research and suggest that separate populations of 
dopamine neurons originating in VTA and projecting to striatum and prefrontal cortex code 
reward and aversive prediction errors respectively.  
1.8 Electrophysiological Studies of PE Signaling in Humans 
While human electrophysiology does not have the spatial resolution of fMRI or the ability 
to image subcortical structures, EEG and MEG have been used extensively to study 
reinforcement learning and prediction error signaling, as well as to make inferences about 
dopamine activity. The general approach that is used in this line of research is to measure 
prefrontal neural activation during a task or activity that has a known effect on subcortical 
dopaminergic nuclei, such as reward anticipation and delivery. In this section I review EEG and 
MEG studies which record electromagnetic activity from the surface of the scalp, and therefore 
measure signals on the same millisecond time scale as invasive recording of dopamine neuron 
electrical activity. 
Most EEG studies of reinforcement have examined event-related potentials (ERPs; 
averaged EEG), with a particular focus on the error-related negativity (ERN) and feedback-
related negativity (FRN). These components of the event-related potential occur following 
behavioral errors and valenced feedback, respectively, and are dominant over prefrontal cortical 
regions. Early theories of the ERN and FRN (known as reinforcement learning FRN theory, or 
RL-FRN) posited that these deflections in the ERP were due to dopamine activity and reflected 
reward prediction errors. Holroyd & Coles (2002) posited that dopamine chronically inhibits the 
apical dendrites of motor neurons in anterior cingulate cortex, and that changes in these 
negative ERP deflections could be due to a pause in the baseline release of dopamine from 
VTA. This pause in baseline release of dopamine would be expected if VTA conveys a signed 
negative prediction error to anterior cingulate cortex. Importantly, Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, Holroyd, 
Schurger, & Cohen (2004) showed that the amplitude of the FRN depends on the difference 
 15 
between expected and actual outcomes and was most negative for unexpected poor outcomes 
in positive reinforcement conditions (reward omission), in line with a reward prediction error 
signal. However, neither of these studies included aversive conditions. A later study by 
Holroyd’s team (Holroyd, Pakzad-Vaezi, & Krigolson, 2008) reinterpreted the RL-FRN 
hypothesis under the idea that the potential difference between correct and error outcomes 
might actually represent a positivity in the waveform induced by delivery of reward, leading 
some researchers to refer to this potential instead as the Reward Positivity. This change in the 
theory did not require a complete overhaul of the dopaminergic hypothesis of the FRN, as the 
authors still contend this signal results from a reward signal conveyed by conventional 
dopamine neurons. Notably, this interpretation requires physiological evidence that DA neurons 
forming the mesocortical pathway actually transmit reward signals, which is lacking in animal 
studies reviewed above.  
Recent research has contradicted the RL-FRN hypothesis. Talmi, Atkinson, & El-Deredy 
(2013) recorded EEG while participants completed a combined positive and negative 
reinforcement task. For positive reinforcement conditions, a secondary reinforcer was used 
(money) and for negative reinforcement a primary reinforcer was used (pain). As expected, FRN 
amplitude was greater for omission of reward than for reward delivery, since dopamine neuron 
firing in VTA decreases from baseline for omission of an expected reward. Unexpectedly, FRN 
amplitude was greater for omission of an aversive painful stimulus than for avoidance of the 
aversive stimulus. If the FRN represents a cortical correlate of a dopaminergic prediction error, 
then this would suggest that the dopamine neurons projecting to prefrontal cortex increase firing 
for delivery of an aversive stimulus compared to avoidance of a negative stimulus. This is in line 
with rat research outlined above, which suggests that the major dopaminergic inputs to 
prefrontal cortex are preferentially excited by salience prediction errors. Therefore, both reward 
and punishment delivery would be encoded by an increase in unconventional VTA neuron firing 
which is conveyed to prefrontal cortex. The results from Talmi, Atkinson, & El-Deredy (2013), as 
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well as basic animal research detailed above, fundamentally contradict the idea that dopamine 
release in PFC should follow a value function, an idea that is central to the RL-FRN hypothesis. 
Several studies have since replicated and extended the results of Talmi, Atkinson, & El-
Deredy (2013). Huang & Yu (2014) examined the FRN in a prediction paradigm which instructed 
participants of the likelihood of a win, then showed the outcome of that trial (no response was 
required). In line with Talmi et al. (2013), FRN amplitude was greater for omission of reward 
than for reward delivery but was also greater for punishment delivery than punishment omission. 
Recently, our lab replicated and extended these results (Rawls, Miskovic, Moody, Lee, Shirtcliff, 
& Lamm, under review). This study included a control condition, which primed the participant 
with an expectation of zero reinforcement value and where the outcome was always zero. As 
expected, there was no difference in FRN amplitude for correct and error feedback when the 
feedback did not include a prediction error. This result suggests that the FRN is driven by a 
conveyed dopaminergic salience prediction error and is not merely the result of error monitoring. 
Sambrook & Goslin (2014) conducted a study where they parametrically modulated prediction 
error and reported significant salience prediction errors in early FRN time windows and mixed 
evidence for value prediction errors across multiple time windows. Furthermore, Sambrook & 
Goslin (2015) conducted a meta-analysis of published ERP studies using great grand averages, 
a technique which measured published ERP waveforms directly and averaged waveforms for 
conditions across many individual studies. These results suggest influences of salience 
prediction errors across much of the ERP waveform including the FRN time period, as well as 
influences of value signals which sometimes overlapped with salience signals. These more 
recent results are in agreement with known neurobiology and so represent a step forward from 
early theories suggesting the FRN represents a signed dopaminergic prediction error, e.g. 
Holroyd & Coles, 2002. However, the relationship between dopamine neurotransmission and 
FRN prediction error signaling is at this point only theoretical and has never been critically 
examined.  
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1.9 The Neglected Role of Time in Dopamine Reinforcement Signaling 
While Sutton & Barto’s (1987) computer science focused class of TD-RL theories is a 
dominant perspective in the study of reinforcement learning, the idea of time, as well as trial-by-
trial variations in brain activity, is completely eschewed in traditional neuroscience studies which 
rely on the averaging of many trials to obtain an accurate measure of brain activity related to 
reinforcement delivery or omission. Despite the omission of time in traditional neuroscience, 
studies have demonstrated a strong role of the passage of time on dopamine release, which 
changes the weights of learning outcomes over time. For example, Niv, Daw, Joel, and Dayan 
(2006) generate an average reinforcement learning model in which subjects choose both what 
action to perform and what latency to perform it at based on a combination of previous task 
outcomes weighted by time. This important application of DA theories to free-response tasks 
specifically implicates a change in learning signals both over time and momentarily (trial-by-
trial), and makes a strong case for the separation of DA signals into tonic (slow) and phasic 
(momentary) components. Specifically, DA concentrations are predicted to change slowly over 
time as an organism learns, in addition to momentary changes in DA concentration following 
individual reinforcing events. Furthermore, TD-RL models suggests that a PE signal is 
generated whenever an organism’s expectation of reward changes (Sutton & Barto, 1987), 
which requires a slow methodical change in DA signaling over time to achieve reinforcement 
learning.  
The idea that DA signals should change slowly over time as an organism learns (tonic) is 
supported by studies completed by Montague, Dayan, Person, & Sejnowski (1995) and 
Montague, Dayan, & Sejnowski (1996) focusing on the insect equivalent of DA, octopamine. 
These results indicated that in insect models, octopamine release closely matched the 
predictions of the TD-RL model. Specifically, octopamine seems to signal phasic (momentary) 
changes in outcome expectation based on previous outcomes that over time progress to slow 
(tonic) changes in octopamine levels as insects learn what to expect. Niv (2007) integrates TD-
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RL theories of dopamine in learning to suggest that slow (tonic) changes in DA concentration 
integrate cost-benefit action analyses in determining the speed of responses, necessarily 
neglected in all studies that examine only the response an organism gives (correct or incorrect) 
but not the speed of that response. Specifically, phasic shifts in DA concentration immediately 
following reinforcing outcomes might change learning rates, while over time, tonic changes in 
DA concentration might facilitate learned aspects of task performance including reaction times.  
Indeed, Beeler, Daw, Frazier, & Zhuang (2010) show important evidence linking slow 
changes in tonic DA concentrations to the exploitation of reward learning. Beeler et al. (2010) 
examined the behavior of hyperdopaminergic knockout mice in a semi-naturalistic instrumental 
learning task. This analysis demonstrated that hyperdopaminergic mice displayed normal 
learning from recent outcomes. That is, knockout mice correctly learned to associate cues and 
outcomes (measured as correct and incorrect responses on lever presses). However, these 
knockout mice instead showed a diminished ability to exploit that learning over time (measured 
as a slower adaptation of responses following learning). Specifically, this predicts that tonic 
changes in DA over the course of learning might shift how well or rapidly an organism exhibits 
learned behaviors over the course of a task, rather than whether or not the organism learns the 
correct response. These separable aspects of DA, or the idea that momentary (phasic) changes 
in DA concentration should change learning of task parameters while slow (tonic) changes in 
DA concentration should alter how rapidly an organism uses the information it has learned, have 
yet to be examined together in human subjects. 
A computational model of midbrain medium spiny neurons (Guthrie, Myers, & Gluck, 
2009) that incorporates tonic levels of DA, therefore considering changes in DA level over time 
rather than momentary or phasic dopamine shifts based solely on outcome, supports 
hypotheses suggesting that for learning to occur, DA levels must change tonically over time. 
This model was able to reproduce 1) the behavior of organisms with normal levels of DA, 2) the 
altered learning of DA deficient Parkinsonian patients, and critically 3) the improvement in DA 
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dependent learning experienced by medicated Parkinsonian patients, providing strong evidence 
of the importance of tonic DA levels in reinforcement learning over time. Parker, Alberico, Miller, 
& Narayanan (2013) demonstrate that expectancy-based reaction time shifts over the course of 
a task critically depend on the binding of DA in PFC, providing further evidence that response 
time, and not just choice, is heavily influenced by outcome expectancy effects. Importantly, 
Bryden, Johnson, Tobia, Kashtelyan, & Roesch (2011) demonstrated that spiking rate of 
neurons in the anterior cingulate cortex of rats signals PEs, but also the need for enhanced 
neural resources following unexpected outcomes, specifying a role of prefrontal DA 
mechanisms in enhancing learning-based activity following outcomes which are beyond those 
expected. This generates the hypothesis, critical to the current work, that cingulate-generated 
potentials should weight learning on future trials as a function of task outcomes. This change in 
activity should compound over time as learning improves and tonic DA levels in ACC change. 
This work also suggested that the most salient or attention-grabbing outcomes should weight 
future learning the most.  
Specific to learning outcomes dependent on PFC activation, Rinaldi, Mandillo, Oliverio, 
and Mele (2007) showed that DA antagonists administered to PFC selectively impaired spatial 
learning that occurs over time in mice. This type of learning, which depends on time but not on 
PEs, therefore seems to selectively depend on tonic DA concentration in PFC. Wood, Simon, 
Koerner, Kass, & Moghaddam (2017) showed a role of real-time action strategy deployment in 
pursuit of a reward in VTA, contrary to the popular belief that real-time action selection depends 
solely on PFC-basal ganglia interactions. This suggests, among other things, that VTA DA 
release provides a crucial computational substrate that allows DA neurons to function in the 
real-time control of behavioral output. A convincing account of the distinction between tonic and 
phasic DA release in PFC is shown by Ellwood et al. (2017). This study shows that tonic (long-
lasting) stimulation of VTA dopaminergic neurons projecting to PFC stimulates maintenance of 
previous action strategies, while phasic (momentary) DA release in PFC instead stimulates 
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behaviors deviating from previously learned sequences. Stopper, Maric, Montes, Wiedman, & 
Floresco (2014) demonstrate that causal override of phasic DA signals redirects action selection 
during decision making, rather than cementing previously learned outcomes in behavior. 
Furthermore, Howe, Tierney, Sandberg, Phillips, & Graybiel (2013) demonstrate that prolonged 
(tonic) DA signaling in striatum calculates both the temporal proximity and the expected 
outcome of rewards to be given in the future. This result is critical for the current study, as in 
human reinforcement learning studies, rewards are not generally administered until the 
completion of the study, therefore constituting a distant, rather than proximal outcome. 
Together, this set of intriguing results generates a hypothesis that tonic stimulation of DA 
neurons projecting to PFC facilitates repetition of previously learned action sequences with 
increased speed, while phasic stimulation of DA projections to PFC facilitates slower but more 
exploratory behaviors in an environment. Note that the distinction of tonic vs. phasic activity is 
separate from the distinction of signed vs. unsigned PE. Rather, knowing that DA projections to 
PFC carry salient, and primarily aversive, information allows the hypothesis that salient aversive 
stimuli will increase both momentary (phasic) DA levels in PFC, as well as slowly changing tonic 
DA levels in PFC over time. Meanwhile, rewarding outcomes should stimulate change in DA 
release (both momentary, and compounding over time) in striatal regions. More specifically, the 
distinction between tonic and phasic shifts in DA concentration is about the time scale of 
signaling, not the PE content of the signal.  
1.10 Current study: prefrontal cortical modulation of learning 
The topic of whether and how the FRN reflects a reinforcement learning signal is hotly 
debated. The classical theory of the reinforcing properties of the FRN (Holroyd & Coles, 2002) 
suggest that the FRN is influenced by a signed prediction error generated by phasic dopamine 
release. This theory is generally vague about the biological underpinnings of these signals. 
Recent evidence suggests that neurons generating signed prediction errors do not project to 
prefrontal cortex (Lammel et al., 2008; Lammel et al., 2011), which is in line with recent 
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evidence that the FRN represents a salience prediction error (Huang & Yu, 2014; Rawls et al., 
under review; Sambrook & Goslin, 2014; Sambrook & Goslin, 2015; Talmi et al., 2013). 
However, despite the neurobiological plausibility of the theory that the FRN reflects salience 
signals transmitted from VTA via the mesocortical dopamine pathway, the relationship of FRN 
PE signaling and dopamine neurotransmission has never been examined. More importantly, 
previous research on the reinforcement learning significance of the FRN completely disregards 
the importance of changes in tonic (slow) DA release in PFC, as the averaging of trials does not 
allow us to examine tonic (slow) changes in PFC activation over time as a human learns. 
Averaging over trials, and therefore nullifying the change in DA levels over time, allows only an 
examination of momentary (phasic) DA signaling in PFC but averages over time and obscures 
slow changes in DA concentration. Specifically, by averaging over all like trials (for example 
reward omission, or reward delivery), tonic (slow) changes in DA are averaged over, leaving 
only the phasic (momentary) DA signal immediately following reinforcing events. To examine 
how slow (tonic) changes in PFC DA concentration might influence the course of reinforcement 
learning, different methods are necessary. I suggest that a new approach is necessary to 
investigate the extent to which tonic (slow) changes over time of DA in PFC. Instead of the 
standard approach in EEG studies, which involves averaging of brain responses over many 
trials, I instead fit computational models to single trials of feedback-related cortical brain signal 
that allow for the passage of time to be included as a quantitative predictor in brain activity.  
1.10 Hypotheses 
Our hypotheses are that 1) the FRN will be sensitive to both reinforcement type (positive 
or negative) and prediction error. I expect a pattern of results indicating a salience prediction 
error – FRN activation should be less negative (more inhibited) for unexpectedly bad and 
unexpectedly good results compared to expected results, in both positive and negative 
reinforcement. Furthermore, based on the aversion specificity of dopamine neurons projecting 
to prefrontal cortex, I expect less negative (more inhibited) FRN activation for negative 
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reinforcement than for positive. Most importantly, I hypothesize that a single-trial analysis using 
trial number (i.e. the passage of time across the duration of the task) as a predictor of the FRN 
will reveal 2) an effect of change over time (trial number) on the FRN, which would concur with 
evidence suggesting that tonic changes in DA concentration influence the PFC representation of 
reinforcement learning. This slow change in PFC signal should reflect learning over time and be 
preferentially driven by salience, rather than value, of delivered outcomes. Finally, I hypothesize 
that 3) time-dependent changes in the FRN will drive faster responding over the course of the 
task, while phasic violations of outcome expectation will instead facilitate slower responding. 
This is in line with animal studies detailed above demonstrating that tonic changes in DA level in 
PFC cement previously learned action strategies and contributes to faster repetition of learned 
actions, while phasic shifts in PFC DA levels instead facilitate slower and more exploratory 
behavior. These hypotheses are consistent with research relating slow changes in tonic levels 
of DA to faster responses in animals. 
1.11 Importance and theoretical impact of proposed study 
There is debate about whether the FRN reflects a salience or value PE, and whether this 
prediction error is influenced by dopamine or not. Notably, this debate has not yet extended to 
whether this signal responds primarily to tonic or phasic DA release in PFC. Previous results 
from our lab indicate that the FRN reflects a salience PE, but these results were derived in the 
standard way, i.e. by averaging over trials and therefore disregarding the passage of time. 
Salience PEs and value PEs are signaled by dopamine in a projection-specific manner (VTA to 
PFC = salience; VTA to NAcc shell = value), and these signals are impacted by slow changes in 
tonic DA concentration over time. Specifically, I expect that both momentary (phasic) and slow 
(tonic) changes in level of DA in PFC should depend on salience (not value) of delivered 
reinforcing outcomes. This prediction utilizes basic neuroscience research showing that 
dopamine neurons projecting to PFC signal primarily aversive salience, and is in line with our 
hypothesis that the FRN reflects a dopaminergic salience prediction error. Furthermore, I test 
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the relationship between the passage of time (trial number) and FRN signaling and hypothesize, 
based on basic animal research detailed above, the FRN (as a measure of PFC activation) 
should respond not only to phasic (trial-by-trial fluctuations in DA level) but also to tonic changes 
in DA level (which occur over the course of time). I suggest that both tonic and phasic task-
based information is integrated in cortical DA signaling, which should speed the acquisition of 
reinforced behaviors while also facilitating action change when needed. I predict that this 
learning effect will be strongest following aversive outcomes, again in accordance with basic 
studies demonstrating that the mesocortical DA pathway primarily carries aversive information. 
Understanding the representation of expectancy violation and time-based learning in the 
prefrontal cortex is key to understanding many disorders revolving around reinforcement and 
dopaminergic dysfunction, such as addiction. Furthermore, these results will inform basic 
theories about how reinforcement signals are communicated through the brain. 
 
2 Methods 
2.1 Participants 
Participants were 59 undergraduate students (37 female, mean age 19.2 [SD 2.06], 2 
left handed) who completed the study after giving informed consent. Participants were excluded 
from signing up for the study if they had a self-reported current psychiatric diagnosis, 
uncorrected visual impairments, or were currently using psychoactive medication. All 
participation exclusion criteria were listed on the online recruitment platform used by the 
University of Arkansas Department of Psychological Sciences, but were not verified via clinical 
interview or otherwise. All procedures described in this study were approved by the University of 
Arkansas Institutional Review Board (Protocol # 1708016049). After recruitment, one participant 
was excluded due to failure to understand task instructions and two additional participants were 
excluded from data analyses due to having too few trials in one or more conditions to analyze (< 
30 trials). All data analyses were conducted on a sample of 56 participants. Participants 
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received course credit for their time in the laboratory (6 credit hours, 8 total required for General 
Psychology students). Additionally, participants were informed they would be paid a cash sum 
based on how many points they accrued throughout the reinforcement task. Participants 
received one US dollar ($1) for every 2000 points they accrued, and on average participants 
received a bonus of $7 at the end of the study (minimum $2, maximum $12). 
2.2 Reinforcement learning task 
Participants completed a reinforced flanker which was a modification of the flanker task 
(Eriksen & Eriksen, 1972) using arrow stimuli (Figure 2). At the beginning of every trial, a 
fixation cross was presented. Following the initial fixation, participants were shown a black-and-
white shape, signifying whether the trial was positive or negative reinforcement. Negative and 
positive reinforcement were presented in pseudo-random order, allowing us to examine both 
changes over time in behavior and brain function as well as the phasic shifts due to unexpected 
reinforcement outcomes in a trial-by-trial fashion. This shape disappeared after 500 ms and was 
replaced with a fixation cross (+) that lasted 500 – 700 ms.  A set of congruent (< < < < < or > > 
> > >) or incongruent (< < > < < or > > < > >) arrows were then shown for 100 ms, followed by a 
fixation cross lasting from 900 – 1100 ms. Valence feedback (correct or incorrect) was shown 
for 500 ms, followed by a fixation cross lasting 500 – 700 ms. Finally, point feedback was shown 
for 1000 ms.  
Importantly, the average return for correct positive reinforcement trials was 50 points, but 
the actual return varied linearly from 20 points to 80 points on a trial-by-trial basis. Likewise, the 
average return for correct negative reinforcement trials was zero points, but the actual return 
varied from -30 to 30 points. Correct answers always resulted in better outcomes than incorrect 
answers. Before participants began, they completed 50 trials for practice. During practice trials, 
the outcome was always as expected (i.e. for positive reinforcement correct answers resulted in 
a gain of 50 points, and for negative reinforcement correct answers resulted in no loss of 
points). Participants could not move on to the main task until they demonstrated understanding 
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of the task during the practice, measured as an accuracy rate of 80% or above during practice. 
One participant was excluded from the study at this point for failure to understand task 
instructions (could not pass the practice after 3 attempts or 150 trials). Four additional 
participants (out of the 56 included) required a second attempt on the practice block in order to 
achieve 80% or greater accuracy. Participants responded using their left thumb (for left arrow 
targets) or their right thumb (for right arrow targets). Participants completed 960 trials of this 
task, divided into 16 blocks of 60 trials each. Completion of the reinforcement task required 
approximately 90 minutes. In the interest of presenting a minimal number of a priori defined 
analyses and hypotheses, only the EEG time-locked to the final point feedback is considered as 
a dependent variable in this manuscript. I do not analyze EEG time-locked to any stimuli other 
than the final point feedback. The current analysis was further restricted to only correct trial 
feedback, in order to remove the confound of error / performance monitoring on PE signaling. 
Note that typical reinforcement learning studies of the FRN require correct answers to provide 
“good” outcomes, and incorrect answers to provide “bad” outcomes, leading to the confounding 
of reinforcement processing and performance monitoring. Since many of the brain regions 
implicated in reinforcement signaling also respond to performance errors, the typical design of 
these studies severely restricts the interpretation of observed brain activity as a reinforcement 
learning signal. By creating an expectation of average outcome in the practice and then 
systematically providing more or less points than expected on correct trials, I separate the effect 
of PE (was it better or worse than expected?) from the effect of error monitoring (was the 
outcome correct or incorrect?).  
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Figure 2. Task diagram for the modified reinforcement flanker paradigm. Participants were cued 
as to whether the current trial was to be positive or negative reinforcement with a white square 
or a white circle, respectively. Participants then had to respond to a flanker arrow stimulus which 
was either congruent or incongruent (congruent and incongruent trials were averaged over for 
the current manuscript). Only correct trials were analyzed, and participants were shown correct 
feedback on every trial prior to the point feedback being shown. Finally, participants were given 
some amount of points which was on average +50 for positive reinforcement and +0 for 
negative reinforcement. The crucial task manipulation was that every trial, the amount of points 
given deviated slightly from the overall mean expectation, generating outcomes which were 
worse-than-expected or better-than-expected. 
 
2.2 EEG processing 
EEG were sampled at 1000 Hz using a 129-channel EGI sensor array referenced to 
vertex (Philips EGI, Inc.). Recording began after impedances were reduced below 50 kΩ. Data 
were processed using EEGLAB 15 (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) and MATLAB 2017 (Mathworks). 
Continuous data were downsampled to 125 Hz with anti-aliasing, low-pass filtered at 30 Hz 
using a zero-phase FIR filter, and high-pass filtered at 0.1 Hz using a zero-phase FIR filter. Bad 
channels were removed using built-in eeglab functions if the channel SD was 4 or greater. 
Copies were made of each dataset, which were high-pass filtered at 1 Hz using a zero-phase 
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FIR filter, in preparation for computing independent components analysis (ICA; Makeig, Jung, 
Bell, & Sejnowski, 1995). All data were epoched into 3 second windows surrounding point 
feedback onset (from -1000 ms before to 2000 ms after). Infomax ICA was computed on the 1 
Hz filtered dataset (Debener et al., 2010). Bad channels were not interpolated before running 
ICA. Artifactual independent components were detected using the SASICA plugin (Chaumon, 
Bishop, & Busch, 2015), which detected artifact components using a combination of three 
methods: 1) autocorrelation statistics, 2) focal component activity, and 3) routines from the 
ADJUST plugin (Mognon, Jovicich, Bruzzone, & Buiatti, 2011). Selected components were 
verified by visual inspection and removed from the data. ICA weights and artifact components 
calculated in the 1 Hz high-pass filtered dataset were copied to the 0.1 Hz high-pass filtered 
dataset; all further analyses were performed on the 0.1 Hz filtered dataset. Epochs containing 
fluctuations with voltage exceeding ±125 µV were detected and removed as well. Removed 
channels were interpolated using spherical splines and data were rereferenced to the montage 
average. Two subjects were excluded from all analyses due to having fewer than 30 clean trials 
in one or more conditions. 
2.3 Conventional trial-averaged analyses 
In order to render the results of this study comparable with the bulk of previous research, 
which used ERPs averaged over trials, I present initially a trial-averaged analysis. I split trials 
according to reinforcement type (positive or negative) and PE type (better or worse than 
expected). I analyzed the average behavior (RTs) after trials of each type in order to examine 
task-related response adaptation (learning) effects. I analyze the averaged ERP following the 
actual outcome (point gain/loss) cue for trials of each of the four trial types (positive/negative, 
better/worse) as well. The ERP was baseline corrected for the 200 ms preceding feedback 
presentation and was examined as the mean voltage from 250 – 350 ms at sensor FCz in line 
with standard FRN analysis procedure. All analyses were conducted in SPSS 26 using 2 
(reinforcement type: positive or negative) X 2 (outcome: better or worse than expected) 
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repeated-measures ANOVAs. Any significant interactions were examined using the SPSS 
emmeans command. Since there were no covariates in this analysis this command provides the 
same result as if serial t-tests were used to examine the simple main effects. No multiple 
correction procedure was used in SPSS as SPSS does not apply a correction for any factors 
with fewer than three levels in an ANOVA (i.e. the results would be exactly the same if a 
Bonferroni correction was applied within SPSS). 
2.4 Single-trial analysis 
2.4.1 Single-trial behavioral analysis: changes in behavior over time 
Single-trial analysis of behavior was initially conducted within each subject to examine 
task-related shifts in reaction times corresponding to reinforcement outcomes. This analysis was 
specifically intended to isolate effects of tonic vs. phasic task-related changes in learning rate. 
That is, within individual subjects, I sought to examine shifts in reaction time over the course of 
the task (tonic), following various magnitudes of prediction error (phasic). The specific task 
manipulation concerned PE signaling in positive and negative reinforcement conditions, during 
better or worse than expected outcomes, as a function of continuous prediction error. Finally, 
differences in learning were incorporated by use of a regressor for trial number (i.e. time on 
task). Therefore, I examined the reaction time in the trial following prediction error presentation 
in the task as a function of task constraints.  
I began by controlling for sources of conflict monitoring or error monitoring that could 
influence task performance. I removed incorrect trials and trials following incorrect trials from 
consideration due to the high performance rate in the task and the fact that errors influence 
learning (performance monitoring control). Next, I fit single-trial robust regression (O’Leary, 
1990) to within-subject RTs for each of four task conditions (positive reinforcement better-than-
expected outcome, positive reinforcement worse-than-expected outcome, negative 
reinforcement better-than-expected outcome, and negative reinforcement worse-than-expected 
outcome), as the task conditions are categorical (Cohen & Cavanagh, 2011). This regression 
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equation was used to remove the influence of flanker congruency for the two flanker stimuli 
preceding the RT, to control for the influence of conflict monitoring & conflict adaptation on the 
ERP. This equation also included the continuous PE value returned on the previous trial, as well 
as the reinforcement cue from the previous trial (positive or negative reinforcement cue) to 
control for the context-dependent nature of the FRN. The studentized residuals of this model 
were returned for each subject and single-trial behavioral analysis was completed for each 
subject using a robust regression model fit to these residuals (RTs controlled for monitoring 
influences). 
The main regression model of interest was a within-subjects model predicting reaction 
times within each of four conditions (positive reinforcement better-than-expected outcome, 
positive reinforcement worse-than-expected outcome, negative reinforcement better-than-
expected outcome, and negative reinforcement worse-than-expected outcome). This allows 
further model comparison between conditions via examination of beta weights. The regression 
used a linear combination of PE (continuous linear variable), and trial number (i.e. time, ranging 
from 1 – 960), as well as an interaction of the two terms. Time and PE were z-scored before 
entering them in the regression so that the magnitude of trial number did not obscure that of PE 
(maximum 960 vs. maximum 80).  All single-trial PE values were orthogonalized by the actual 
outcome value to ensure that any detected effects correspond to a true effect of PE. Note that 
the ability to fit precise models such as this is a key feature of single-trial within-subject 
regression analysis as this level of specificity and control is impossible to achieve in a trial-
averaged analysis. 
This model was fit to predict studentized residual RTs in the trial immediately following 
the prediction error outcome, in order to separate influences of trial number over the task and 
expectancy violations on response times. Beta weights from within-subject robust regression 
can be assumed to be Gaussian by the central limit theorem, and therefore were subjected to t-
tests against a null hypothesis mean of zero, i.e. no relationship between the regressor and 
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reaction times. Each t-test proceeded with 53 degrees of freedom. Figure 3 indicates the task 
design and the equations used for single trial analyses. 
 
 
Figure 3. Regression model diagram for the reinforcement task. Single-trial modeling proceeded 
separately for positive and negative reinforcement, and worse-than expected vs. better-than-
expected trials, resulting in four models for the RT and four models for the ERP. I used robust 
regression to model out all unwanted effects in a first control step while returning studentized 
residuals of RT and ERP. Control effects are shown with a yellow border. A second, meaningful 
analysis was conducted by using robust regression to fit all parameters of interest to both the 
single-trial RT and ERP. Finally, RTs were examined using stepwise regression as a function of 
task constraints, and as as a function of the ERP. This third step formally tests whether the ERP 
predicts reinforcement learning effects in this task. 
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2.4.2 Single-trial EEG analysis framework 
For each participant, the single-trial FRN was measured at a cluster of mediofrontal 
sensors (radius 6 cm) centered on FCz (sensor 6 on the EGI cap). I restricted single-trial 
analyses to a cluster of neighboring prefrontal sensors based on standard measurement 
locations for the FRN. Since trial number resulted in positive beta weights at occipital sensors, 
this prevented the spurious selection of occipital sensors for FRN analyses. The single-trial FRN 
values were submitted to the same control analysis as the RT values described above, with the 
exception that control values following the FRN were excluded as they had not occurred yet 
(trial n). I then applied the regression model of interest to the single-trial ERPs from 100 – 600 
ms post-feedback. For each subject, the mediofrontal sensor showing the greatest cumulative 
R2 was selected for further analysis as in (Bieniek, Frei, & Rousselet, 2013; Rousselet, Husk, 
Pernet, Gaspar, Bennett, & Sekuler, 2009; Rousselet, Gaspar, Pernet, Husk, Bennett, & 
Sekuler, 2010). The regression model applied to the EEG yields b values for each time point 
that can be assumed to be Gaussian by the central limit theorem and were therefore tested 
across subjects using two-tailed t-tests at each time point, followed by correction for multiple 
comparisons using Benjamini & Yekutieli’s (2001) false discovery rate with an alpha of .05. I 
tested for condition differences in significant regression results using a series of 2 X 2 repeated 
measures ANOVAs (one for each time point from 96 – 600 ms, sampled at 125 Hz, therefore 64 
ANOVAs). Significant ANOVA effects representing condition differences (due to reinforcement 
type or better vs. worse outcomes) were further examined using paired t-tests with 53 degrees 
of freedom. 
2.4.3 Prediction of reinforcement learning over the course of the task 
I fit a final model that predicted residualized RTs (calculated as described above) using a 
stepwise regression to assess whether mediofrontal activity following feedback presentation 
predicts reaction time in the following trial. The first step of this regression was the same as for 
the behavioral analysis, that is, the equation predicted controlled RTs as a function of the 
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previous PE and the previous reinforcement type. The second step of this equation entered the 
single-trial feedback-locked EEG as a regressor, to determine if mediofrontal activity predicts 
following-trial response time over and above the task itself. Again, this regression model applied 
to predict RT using the EEG yields b values for each time point that can be assumed to be 
Gaussian by the central limit theorem and were therefore tested across subjects using two-
tailed t-tests at each time point, followed by correction for multiple comparisons using Benjamini 
& Yekutieli’s (2001) false discovery rate with an alpha of .05. 
 
3 Results  
3.1  Conventional (trial-averaged) results 
3.1.1 Trial-averaged analysis of reaction times 
Reaction times were grouped according to which of the four different trial conditions they 
followed, producing four mean RTs for each participant (RTs following positive reinforcement 
better-than-expected outcomes, RTs following positive reinforcement worse-than-expected 
outcomes, RTs following negative reinforcement better-than-expected outcomes, and RTs 
following negative reinforcement worse-than-expected outcomes). Mean RTs following each of 
four trial types were analyzed according to a 2 (reinforcement type: positive or negative) X 2 
(outcome: better or worse than expected) ANOVA. Results indicated a main effect of outcome 
(better or worse), F(1,53) = 9.56, p = .003, ηp2 = .15, which was subsumed by a significant 
interaction between reinforcement type and outcome, F(1,53) = 15.86, p = .0002, ηp2 = .23. 
Results of post hoc analyses confirmed that, for better-than-expected outcomes, RTs were 
faster following positive reinforcement trials compared to negative reinforcement trials, p = .009. 
The opposite was true worse-than-expected outcomes: RTs were faster following negative 
reinforcement trials compared to positive reinforcement trials, p = .003. Within reinforcement 
type, only positive reinforcement showed a significant difference. RTs following better-than-
expected outcomes were faster than RTs following worse than expected outcomes, p = 4e-6. 
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This difference was not significant for negative reinforcement trials, p = .31. Graphical depiction 
of RT effects are shown in figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4. Trial averaged reaction times. Results indicated that, following better-than-expected 
outcomes, RTs were faster following positive reinforcement trials than following negative 
reinforcement trials. This effect was reversed following worse-than-expected outcomes. Finally, 
RTs were slower following worse-than-expected outcomes than following better-than-expected 
outcomes in positive reinforcement conditions only. 
 
3.1.2 Conventional analysis of FRN amplitude 
Similar to the RT analysis, FRN activations were grouped according to which of the four 
different trial conditions they followed  and analyzed according to a 2 (reinforcement type: 
positive or negative) X 2 (better-than-expected or worse-than-expected outcome) ANOVA. 
Results indicated a main effect of outcome (better-than-expected or worse-than-expected), 
F(1,53) = 14.05, p = .0004, ηp2 = .21, which was subsumed by a significant interaction between 
reinforcement type and outcome, F(1,53) = 13.72, p = .001, ηp2 = .21. Results of post hoc 
analyses showed that the influence of outcome was only apparent for negative reinforcement 
outcomes. Negative reinforcement outcomes that were better-than-expected resulted in a more 
negative FRN compared to worse-than-expected, p = 5e-5. This indicates a reverse effect of PE 
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on FRN amplitude for negative reinforcement (that is, the FRN is more negative for better-than-
expected than worse-than-expected outcomes in negative reinforcement), which is in line with 
the majority of recent research on the FRN. For worse-than-expected outcomes, FRN amplitude 
was more negative for positive compared to negative reinforcement trials, p = .0006. 
Furthermore, the effect of PE on the FRN was non-significant, which I attribute to the unique 
task manipulation which allows for a worse-than-expected reward to be delivered, as opposed 
to standard task designs which conflate full reward omission with worse-than-expected 
outcomes. The waveforms and difference topographic plots for this analysis are detailed in 
figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5. Graphical depiction of traditional ERP results. The left panel depicts the feedback-
locked ERP for each of four conditions. Negative is plotted downward and the red shaded area 
indicates the time period used for analysis of ERP amplitudes (250 – 350 ms). Topographic 
plots to the right indicate the scalp distribution of the worse-than-expected minus better-than-
expected difference. Topoplots are plotted with a standard hot-cold color template where red 
colors indicate positivities in the difference waveform and blue colors indicate negativities in the 
difference waveform. Both topographic plots are shown with a symmetric colormap to facilitate 
comparison of results. The colormap limits are indicated on the bar to the right of the 
topographic plots. 
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3.2 Single-Trial analysis of brain and behavior 
3.2.1 Changes in reaction times are modulated by reinforcement salience 
Rather than analyzing differences in mean RT, in this next section I use robust 
regression analysis to examine how single-trial RTs change over the course of the task 
(denoted as trial number from now on). For positive reinforcement conditions with better-than 
expected outcomes, only a main effect of trial number on RT was significant, mean beta weight 
= -.057, t(53) = -3.39, p = .001, which indicated that correct RTs became faster as trial number 
increased but this effect did not depend on the value of the prediction error. For positive 
reinforcement conditions with worse-than-expected outcomes, a mean effect of trial number was 
significant, mean beta weight = -.103, t(53) = -2.49, p = .015. This effect again indicated that 
correct RTs became faster as trial number increased but this effect did not depend on the value 
of the prediction error. This indicates an interesting null effect of continuous PE on reaction 
times in positive reinforcement. This is likely due to the fact that our task manipulation always 
resulted in some level of reward for positive reinforcement – correct trials, unlike task designs 
which conflate worse-than-expected outcomes with error commission. 
Results for RTs following better-than-expected negative reinforcement outcomes 
indicated only a significant interaction between continuous PE value and trial number, mean 
beta weight = -.111, t(55) = -2.983, p = .004. Results for worse-than-expected negative 
reinforcement outcomes indicated significant main effects of both continuous PE, mean beta 
weight = .111, t(55) = 2.772, p = .007, and trial number, mean beta weight = -.06, t(55) = -3.892, 
p = .0003, as well as a significant interaction between continuous PE value and trial number, 
mean beta weight = .088,  t(55) = 3.005, p = .004. These interaction effects were examined in 
more detail by utilizing the suggestions of Aiken, West, and Reno (1991), Barron and Kenny 
(1986) and Dawson (2014) in probing the impact of trial number on following reaction times at 
low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) levels of prediction error value. 
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For better-than-expected negative reinforcement outcomes, I found that more positive 
prediction error values (+1 SD, i.e. further from expectation) resulted in increased faster RTs 
over the course of the task, mean beta weight = .18, t(55) = 2.021, p = .04, but less positive PE 
values (-1 SD, i.e. closer to expectation) resulted in slower RTs over the course of the task, 
mean beta weight = -.04, t(55) = -2.16, p = .03. For worse-than-expected outcomes negative 
reinforcement outcomes, I found that more negative PE values (-1 SD, i.e. further from 
expectation) resulted in faster RTs over the course of the task, mean beta weight = -.15, t(55) = 
-5.34, p = 1.97e-6, but less negative PE values (+1 SD, i.e. closer to expectation) did not result 
in changes in response time as trial number increased (p = .47).  
These effects demonstrate the influence of prediction errors and trial number on learning 
following negative reinforcement (by examining the next trial’s behavior). Responses become 
quicker over trial number following unexpectedly better-than-expected negative reinforcement 
outcomes, and following worse-than-expected negative reinforcement outcomes responses 
become slower over the course of the task when outcomes are nearer to the expectation. 
Meanwhile, these results show that following positive reinforcement conditions, responses 
become quicker over the course of the task (trial number) and do not depend on the value of 
prediction errors. This suggests that in this task, participants learning was modulated by 
prediction errors in negative, but not positive, reinforcement conditions. 
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Figure 6. Single-trial reaction time analysis. I investigated the impact of reinforcement type 
(positive or negative), PE type (worse or better than expected), signed PE, and trial number by 
using separate single-trial robust regression of reaction times following worse-and-better than 
expected positive and negative reinforcement outcomes as a function of signed PE, trial 
number, and their interaction in order to specifically examine the influence of prediction error 
values on task learning, measured using RTs. Bar graphs depict mean between-subject 
regression results and t-tests for differences from zero; line graphs depict moderation analyses 
of significant interaction effects using the standard method of testing moderation effects at -1 
SD and +1 SD from the mean. Important effects for further analysis are outlined in red for 
readability. There was only a main effect of trial for positive reinforcement conditions, but an 
interaction of trial and continuous PE for negative reinforcement trials. 
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3.2.2 FRN reflects processing of reinforcement and trial number 
I analyzed the single-trial raw EEG by using robust regression in the same way as RTs 
described in the preceding section. This model was fit to every post-stimulus time point from 96 
to 600 ms, yielding 64 regressions which were corrected for multiple comparisons using the 
false discovery rate (FDR; Benjamini & Yekutieli, 2001). Interestingly, single-trial ERP 
regression results indicated only significant main effects of trial number on the feedback-locked 
ERP; no effects of continuous PE were present (all p > .016, did not meet FDR cutoff). The 
effect of trial number on the ERP was not significant in all task conditions. Specifically, an early 
mediofrontal effect (maximal 140 ms) likely corresponding to trial number modulation of the 
frontal N1 was significant in positive reinforcement better-than-expected trials, positive 
reinforcement worse-than-expected outcome trials, and negative reinforcement worse-than-
expected trials, while a later mediofrontal effect of trial number corresponding to the FRN was 
significant only for positive reinforcement better-than-expected trials and negative reinforcement 
worse-than-expected trials (i.e. the most salient outcomes). For N1 effects, results indicated that 
over increasing trial numbers the N1 grew more positive, i.e. habituated. For FRN effects, 
results instead indicated that the FRN grew more negative over the course of the task, likely 
corresponding to task learning effects which occur as trial number increases. Interestingly, the 
effect of trial number on the FRN was only significant for positive reinforcement trials with better-
than-expected rewards and negative reinforcement with worse-than-expected aversive stimuli. 
All statistics for this analysis are presented graphically in figure 7. 
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Figure 7. Single-trial ERP regression results. Results indicated no effect of continuous PE on 
the mediofrontal ERP. Instead, the main effect of trial number was significant for the FRN only 
when the outcome was salient (i.e. positive reinforcement better-than-expected outcomes, 
negative reinforcement worse-than-expected outcomes), in line with previous evidence that the 
FRN primarily reflects a binary decision of outcome-expectation match. Interestingly, there was 
also a main effect of trial number on the mediofrontal N1, which indicated that the N1 grew less 
negative (i.e. habituated) as trial number increased. This effect is line with the interpretation of 
the N1 as an early sensory potential, which is expected to habituate as a subject becomes 
familiar with task stimuli and requirements. Topographic plots are included to demonstrate the 
spatial extent of the observed effects, and do not indicate significance or lack thereof in 
themselves. Topographic plots are shown with a standard hot-cold color scheme where red 
indicates positive regression coefficients and blue indicates negative regression coefficients. 
Red shades in line plots indicate regions of significant single-trial regressions. Significance for 
within-subject regression coefficients was determined using one-sample t-tests, which test 
against a null hypothesized sample mean of zero.  
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3.2.3 FRN trial number effects differ by reinforcement and PE 
While the previous results indicated that the regression effect of trial number was 
significant for positive reinforcement better-than-expected trials and negative reinforcement 
worse-than-expected trials (i.e. for only the most salient trials or the trials furthest from the 
average outcome over all conditions), this does not directly indicate whether the representation 
of trial number is different between different types of trials. That is, the effect of trial number 
might have been barely non-significant in one or more conditions, but not significantly different 
from other conditions. Therefore, I conducted a series of 2 X 2 repeated-measures ANOVAs on 
the beta coefficient for waveform trial number at each point from 96 – 600 ms. The statistical 
results of this set of ANOVA analyses, including F-values, p-values, and ηp2 (a measure of 
ANOVA effect size), are presented graphically in Figure 8. Results after correction for multiple 
corrections showed no main effects of reinforcement type or outcome type on mediofrontal beta 
weights for trial number, but a significant interaction between reinforcement type (positive or 
negative) and outcome (worse-than-expected or better-than-expected) emerged from 200 – 250 
ms indicating that the neural representation of trial number differed between the four conditions.  
 
 
Figure 8. ANOVA testing of single-trial regressions. I tested whether regression weights for trial 
number differed by condition using a series of 2 X 2 repeated-measures ANOVAs. Shaded 
areas of line plots indicate regions of significance over time.  Results indicated a significant 
interaction between the factors of Reinforcement Type (positive or negative) and Outcome Type 
(better-than-expected or worse-than-expected) during the same time period as the FRN has 
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been identified in the literature and the same time as the significant mediofrontal effects of trial 
number in the previous analysis, confirming that the brain representation of trial number differs 
between conditions. Topographic plots do not indicate significance or lack thereof but are 
instead shown only to indicate the relative spatial extent of the observed effects. Topographic 
plots are shown with the same standard hot-cold color scheme where red indicates high 
ANOVA F-values and blue indicates low ANOVA F-values. Note that the dominance of blue (low 
F) shows the relatively low ANOVA F-tests for nearly all points; the mediofrontal cluster that is 
lighter blue is the only region where the ANOVA tests were near significance. Due to individual 
differences in which sensor provided the best model fit and was therefore selected for further 
analysis, the actual sensors selected for analysis showed a significant interaction effect while 
the topos only show a region that is closer to significance than other points. 
 
I quantified the results of this ANOVA interaction by using serial t-tests to determine the 
simple effects of reinforcement type and outcome type on the brain representation of trial 
number. Note that this procedure returns the same values as typical post hoc analyses 
computed in e.g. SPSS using either a LSD or Bonferroni correction, as this software does not 
apply any correction for factors with less than three levels; therefore, these results are 
equivalent to any corrected post hoc procedure which might be employed in SPSS. Results 
indicated that, as expected based on the previous results (section 3.2.2) mediofrontal beta 
weights for trial number were greater for positive reinforcement better-than-expected outcome 
trials and for negative reinforcement worse-than-expected outcome trials than for positive 
reinforcement worse-than-expected outcome trials or negative reinforcement better-than-
expected outcome trials. All statistical results from this analysis, including t-values and p-values, 
are presented graphically in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9. Post hoc testing of single-trial ANOVAs. I used serial t-tests to determine the source of 
identified interaction effects from repeated-measures ANOVA. Results indicated that for the 
most salient outcomes, i.e. the outcomes furthest from the overall task average (positive 
reinforcement better-than-expected, negative reinforcement worse-than-expected), the impact 
of trial number on the mediofrontal potential was strongest, while it was significantly lower for 
the less salient outcomes, i.e. the outcomes closest to the overall task expectation (positive 
reinforcement worse-than-expected, negative reinforcement better-than-expected). 
 
3.2.4 Mediofrontal ERP predicts aversive reinforcement learning 
To determine whether the mediofrontal ERP predicts learning in the following trial, I used 
the approach and matlab program described in (Fischer & Ullsperger, 2013). That is, I fit a 
stepwise regression model to the RT where the first steps of the model were the same as 
described above in Section 2.1. In the second step of the regression, I used single trials of 
feedback-locked EEG to predict RTs on the following trial, therefore testing whether neural 
processing of reinforcing events predicts adaptation of reaction times over and above the 
behavioral impact of the task. Critically, feedback-locked EEG robustly predicted RT on the 
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following trial, but only for negative reinforcement conditions with aversive (i.e. worse than 
expected) outcomes. This is in line with prior evidence suggesting that mediofrontal involvement 
in reinforcement, as well as the release of DA via the mesocortical tract, is primarily modulated 
by aversive experiences. Therefore, it is to be expected that mediofrontal brain activity should 
predict reaction times only following delivery of aversive stimuli. By contrast, positive 
reinforcement conditions never deliver aversive stimuli – the worst outcome in positive 
reinforcement conditions was an outcome of +20 points, which while lower than expectations, 
cannot be said to be an aversive stimulus. All statistical results from this analysis are illustrated 
graphically in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10. Single-trial brain-RT regression results. I used stepwise regression to determine 
whether feedback-locked brain activity in any of the four task outcome conditions predicted RT 
on the following trial. Topographic plots indicate the beta weights of EEG predicting reaction 
times using a standard hot-cold color template where blue indicates more negative beta 
coefficients while red indicates more positive beta coefficients. Results indicated that 
mediofrontal activity only predicted future behavioral adaptation in negative reinforcement 
conditions that were paired with delivery of an aversive stimulus. Notably, the effect of brain 
activity on following trial RTs also concentrated over mediofrontal electrodes (red clusters 
indicating positive beta weights). More specifically, the FRN exhibited a positive relationship 
with RT, such that more negative FRN amplitude over the course of the task predicted faster 
RTs, in line with an interpretation of the effect of trial number on the FRN as a learning signal. 
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This is in line with the suggestion that mediofrontal cortex is sensitive to release of DA 
according to evidence from Lammel (2015), who indicated that activity of the mesocortical DA 
tract selectively drives aversive reinforcement learning. 
 
4 Discussion 
In this study, I examined reinforcement learning effects in behavior (RTs) and the 
relationship of reinforcement learning to the mediofrontal ERP using a reinforcement learning 
task that avoids many of the pitfalls inherent in standard FRN analyses. Specifically, this task 
generated trial-by-trial expectancy-outcome discrepancies (prediction errors, PEs) in a way such 
that participants did not necessarily pair “incorrect” response feedback with “worse-than-
expected” outcomes and “correct” feedback with “better-than-expected” outcomes. Furthermore, 
I used a computational approach to examine the ERP at the level of single trials. This is 
necessary in order to actually test neural implementations of reinforcement learning algorithms, 
as all extant learning algorithms specify the update of expectancies either trial-by-trial (Rescorla 
& Wagner, 1972) or continuously over time (Sutton & Barto, 1998). In standard studies of 
reinforcement learning and the feedback-locked ERP, this theoretically mandated change over 
time is nullified by the approach of averaging brain potentials over the entire task. Finally, I 
examined behavioral output in the same trial-by-trial manner as the ERP. This allows me to 
theoretically ground my behavioral results in animal literature indicating outcome- and trial 
number-dependent changes in reaction times, as well as to make putative conclusions about 
the differential impacts of tonic vs. phasic shifts in DA concentration released via the 
mesocortical pathway. 
4.1 Comparison of Results to Standard ERP Studies of Reinforcement 
There is a long-standing debate about whether the feedback-related negativity (FRN) 
signals a salience prediction error or a value prediction error (Figure 1). While there is a general 
agreement that we primarily learn the importance of environmental stimuli based on rewarding 
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and aversive experiences (Dayan & Balleine, 2002; Sutton & Barto, 1998), there is substantial 
disagreement in the ERP literature about how these signals are displayed in the cortex. 
4.1.1 The Reinforcement Learning Feedback Related Negativity Hypothesis 
Since the initial inception of the reinforcement learning FRN hypothesis (RL-FRN; 
Holroyd & Coles, 2002) a substantial body of evidence has been built suggesting that the FRN 
conveys a dopaminergic (DA) signed (value) PE signal. Holroyd & Coles (2002) argue for the 
existence of two separate neural systems that together influence adaptive behaviors, i.e., a 
mesencephalic reinforcement learning system and a “generic” error monitoring system in the 
cingulate cortex. Through combined computational modeling and psychophysiological 
experimentation, they suggest that the error-related negativity (ERN), a negative-going ERP 
component peaking soon after the commission of behavioral errors, might be elicited when an 
error-monitoring system detects that outcomes are worse than expected, and that this error 
signal is used to train motor systems in line with reinforcement learning principles. Citing prior 
evidence that delayed error feedback also produces an ERN-like deflection (Miltner, Braun, & 
Coles, 1997), the authors argue that this potential is not generated merely by the commission of 
an error, but instead by detection of the error, or perhaps by the use of the behavioral error to 
guide future behavior. They tested this hypothesis by having subjects complete a probabilistic 
reinforcement learning task utilizing certain and uncertain reward predictors, and correct or 
incorrect feedback. Change over time in the feedback-related negativity was assessed by 
binning ERPs into ten-trial running averages. Results indicated tonic shifts in the amplitude of 
the FRN over the task, which depended on the delivered outcome and the probability of that 
outcome. In general, since this initial study the impact of time on the feedback-locked brain 
potential has been discarded in favor examining the specific type of PE term contained in the 
ERP. Citing evidence from Schulz’s group, Holroyd & Coles (2002) contend that any DA 
reinforcement learning signal should follow a value function, and therefore suggest that the FRN 
must be influenced by the value discrepancy between the outcome and expectation. At the time 
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Holroyd and Cole published their work on the RL-FRN hypothesis, the value hypothesis 
concerning DA response was the dominant perspective in the neurophysiological literature 
examining reinforcement learning. The possibility that this cingulate-generated signal should 
reflect a value signal has been supported by many studies since their initial publication but is not 
in line with known neurophysiology of the DA system that has come to light since this 
hypothesis was conceived. 
4.1.2 FRN Results Part 1 (Standard ERP Studies): Lack of Positive Reinforcement 
Coding in the FRN 
Initially I conducted a standard ERP analysis (averaging across trials) of the feedback-
related negativity to render these results comparable to the bulk of the literature on the FRN. My 
results indicated that the FRN only differentiated between worse-than-expected and better-than-
expected outcomes in negative reinforcement conditions. Furthermore, the FRN was more 
negative following better-than-expected negative reinforcement outcomes than following worse-
than-expected outcomes. My results did not indicate any difference in the mediofrontal ERP 
between worse-than-expected and better-than-expected positive reinforcement outcomes.  
This null effect is contrary to the bulk of the FRN literature. For example, the initial set of 
studies on which the RL-FRN hypothesis was founded (Holroyd & Coles, 2002) indicated that 
the FRN was more negative for reward omission than for reward delivery. This result was 
replicated and the RL-FRN hypothesis extended by the results of Holroyd, Pakzad-Vaezi, and 
Krigolson (2008). While Holroyd et al. (2008) indicated again that the FRN was more 
pronounced for reward omissions than reward deliveries, they reinterpreted the basis of these 
results as a correct-related positivity in the waveform. It is important to note at this point that the 
interpretation of the mediofrontal potential as a reward positivity (as opposed to an aversion 
negativity) relies only on the order in which a difference wave is computed, as difference waves 
have been the method of choice in most of the past literature examining the feedback-locked 
mediofrontal potential. As our study does not use difference waves, we refer to the potential by 
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the original and standard name in the literature, in line with inspection of our grand-average 
waveforms indicating a negative-going peak during the time period of 250-350 ms post-
feedback. The result describing a more negative mediofrontal potential following reward 
omission than reward delivery has been replicated many times in the literature. For example, 
Cooper, Duke, Pickering, and Smillie (2014) recorded EEG during an associative learning task 
that used only positive reinforcement and produced results clearly indicating that the FRN was 
most pronounced for unexpected reward omission, in line with an aversion account of the FRN. 
A study by Potts, Martin, Kamp, and Donchin (2011) introduced the task design that the Cooper 
et al. (2014) study was based on and provided essentially equivalent results, namely that the 
FRN was most negative for unexpected reward omissions in line with an aversion PE.  
However, the current task design differs from previous task designs in one critical 
aspect. Note that the previously cited works have all compared the delivery of a reward to the 
omission of a reward, following the Skinnerian definition of positive reinforcement. However, 
these studies shared a common flaw that appears to be largely unrecognized in the literature. 
Namely, mediofrontal activity is highly sensitive to knowledge of error commission and 
performance monitoring. While a discussion of the effect of error and performance monitoring is 
largely outside the scope of this manuscript, we refer the reader to a recent review by Gehring, 
Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin (2018) covering the error-related brain potential. Indeed, work 
demonstrating the influence of errors and error feedback on mediofrontal ERPs is far more 
numerous than work examining the response of the mediofrontal potential to prediction errors. 
For example, a PubMed search combining the terms using the search terms (“FRN” OR 
“feedback-related negativity” OR “feedback negativity” OR “reward positivity”) AND (“prediction 
error”) conducted over the last ten years returns 89 studies, while a search for ("ERN" OR 
"error-related negativity" OR "error negativity") returns 1019 studies in the last ten years. 
So why is the fact that mediofrontal cortex is sensitive to the commission and recognition 
of errors important for the current work? Interestingly, the previous studies all had something in 
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common. Namely, “worse” outcomes, or reward omissions, always occurred on incorrect trials, 
while “better” outcomes, or reward deliveries, always occurred on correct trials. I propose that 
this inherently confounds the mediofrontal response to errors and the mediofrontal response to 
PEs. This confound is thoroughly engrained in the literature examining whether the FRN reflects 
a PE. In fact, in the original RL-FRN paper by Holroyd and Coles (2002) the FRN was called the 
feedback error-related negativity. This confound is notably not present in the original work 
documenting dopaminergic PEs by Schulz’ research group (1997, 1998). In this work, monkeys 
were simply cued to create an expectation of reward, which was then delivered (expected) or 
not delivered (unexpected). Therefore, while the animal research the RL-FRN hypothesis was 
initially built on did not confound performance monitoring signals with PE signaling (the monkey 
did not perform), most of the human PE research has carried this confound. 
Our task design notably does not contain this confound in any analysis. I analyzed only 
correct trials, and more specifically only trials where participants already knew they were correct 
in their response (see Figure 1). Therefore, this study design allows for the systematic violation 
of reward expectations, while controlling for error monitoring effects (that is, there were none 
because all trials analyzed are correct). Our finding of a null difference between worse-than-
expected and better-than-expected outcomes in positive reinforcement therefore suggests that 
in the absence of error monitoring, mediofrontal potentials might not signal reward prediction 
errors. 
4.1.3 FRN Results Part 2 (Standard ERP Studies): Negative Reinforcement (Aversive) 
Coding in the FRN 
Our results for negative reinforcement conditions tell a different story, indicating that the 
FRN is primarily responsive to aversive outcomes, rather than graded positive outcomes. 
Specifically, our analysis of the ERP shows that the FRN is more negative for better-than-
expected outcomes in negative reinforcement (that is, those outcomes where the subject 
expected zero points but instead received a small reward) compared to worse-than-expected 
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outcomes in negative reinforcement conditions (that is, those conditions where the subject 
expected zero points but instead lost a small number of points). These results cannot be 
attributed to any form of error monitoring as the participants were already informed that their 
response was correct (see task design section for more info on this; see Figure 1). Importantly, 
the absolute deviation of rewards and punishments from the average expectation was 
equivalent between positive and negative reinforcement in our study, indicating that the FRN is 
indeed more sensitive to aversive expectancy violation than positive expectancy violation. A 
number of studies support a view of the FRN as carrying primarily aversive information or 
negative PEs.  
For example, among the (admittedly small) number of studies that have examined the 
FRN in negative reinforcement conditions, the finding of a more negative potential following 
better-than-expected outcomes compared to worse-than-expected outcomes is well established. 
This effect was initially described in a seminal study by Talmi, Atkinson, and El-Deredy (2013) 
using blocks of positive reinforcement with money as the reinforcer, and negative reinforcement 
with electric shock as the reinforcer. This study was the original study to show an effect that 
when both positive and negative reinforcement are considered, the FRN flips sign between 
positive and negative reinforcement conditions, indicating a salience signal rather than a value 
signal. Specifically, the FRN was more negative for omitted positive and negative reinforcement 
outcomes than for delivered positive or negative reinforcement outcomes. Our results uphold 
the results of Talmi et al.’s analysis for negative reinforcement conditions, indicating that the 
FRN is more negative for better-than-expected negative reinforcement conditions than worse-
than-expected negative reinforcement conditions. Huang and Yu (2014) demonstrate convincing 
convergent evidence for this effect in a task that includes both positive and negative 
reinforcement. This task generated the result that FRN amplitudes were more negative for 
reward omissions compared to reward deliveries, but more negative for punishment omissions 
than for punishment deliveries. Since these types of outcome are opposite in valence this must 
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be interpreted as salience coding. Sallet, Camille, and Procyk (2013) demonstrate a similar 
effect using multiple levels of positive and negative PE. They indicate that the FRN is most 
negative for the worst positive PEs, but is most negative for the best negative PEs.  
This flip in sign between positive and negative modalities (i.e. the FRN is most negative 
for reward omissions, but most negative for escape from aversive outcomes as well) strongly 
supports the notion of salience coding in the FRN. Hird, El-Deredy, Jones, and Talmi (2018) 
demonstrate convergent results using a paradigm that delivered appetitive and aversive tastes. 
They observed a “typical FRN” (more negative for reward omission) in the appetitive condition, 
but a “reverse FRN” for aversive tastes (that is, the FRN was more negative for omission of 
aversive outcomes than for delivery of aversive outcomes), in line with a salience account. 
While this study also demonstrated aversive PEs later in the waveform, there were notably no 
effects of reward PE, in opposition to RL-FRN theory. Pfabigan et al. (2015), using a Monetary 
Incentive Delay (MID) paradigm, demonstrate that the FRN is more negative for reward 
omission compared to reward delivery, but is reversed for negative reinforcement, being more 
negative for avoidance of aversive stimulus delivery than for delivery of aversive stimuli. These 
“reverse FRN” results were replicated in a study I completed last year (Rawls, Miskovic, Moody, 
Lee, Shirtcliff, & Lamm, under review), again using an MID paradigm. In a critical step, Pfabigan 
et al. (2015) demonstrated that activity localized to cingulate cortex (putative generator of the 
FRN) showed the same effects that were observed at the scalp level. This is notable, because it 
suggests that indeed, as predicted by neurobiology, the cingulate cortex computes salience, not 
value, PEs. In one of the most convincing source-localized FRN studies, Hauser et al. (2014) 
simultaneously recorded EEG and fMRI during a probabilistic reinforcement learning task. This 
study rigorously examined the expression of signed and unsigned PEs in the post-feedback 
waveform while using the superior spatial information provided by fMRI to localize the FRN 
definitively to the cingulate cortex. This study orthogonalized signed and unsigned PEs (which 
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are often correlated), and demonstrated that only unsigned PEs project to the FRN topography 
using dynamic causal modeling. 
It is not surprising to the author that more studies support the view of the FRN as being 
responsive to salient, primarily aversive, outcomes, as it is in line with basic neurobiology of the 
DA system, which is known to carry primarily aversive information along the mesocortical 
pathway in animal models (Lammel et al., 2008; Lammel et al., 2011). Our trial-averaged results 
fully support previous findings that the FRN is more negative for better-than-expected outcomes 
than for worse-than-expected outcomes when negative reinforcement is cued. Original RL-FRN 
hypotheses suggest that dopamine release might inhibit the apical dendrites of pyramidal cells 
in mediofrontal cortex, resulting in a more positive potential (since the FRN is a negative-going 
potential following feedback). Our results are well in line with this long-standing way of thinking. 
Specifically, based on known neurobiology, we would hypothesize that dopamine release in 
cortex should increase as aversive outcomes are delivered, which could explain the less-
negative mediofrontal potential (FRN) following worse-than-expected outcomes compared to 
better-than-expected outcomes for negative reinforcement. 
4.2 Single-Trial Analysis of Reinforcement Learning 
4.2.1 Single-Trial Results Part 1: Influence of Trial number on The Feedback-Related 
Negativity 
If hypotheses regarding the biological underpinnings of the FRN are true, then there 
should be a change in the ERP amplitude as outcomes are learned. While the original RL-FRN 
paper (Holroyd & Coles) indicated that the FRN became more negative as trial number 
increased, and this activation instead propagated to the outcome cue over time in line with 
expectations of a DA modulated signal, relatively few studies have examined the hypothetically 
mandated shift in FRN amplitude over the course of the task. A notable exception is Krigolson, 
Hassal, and Handy (2014), who convincingly demonstrated that the aversion PE in the FRN 
became more negative over time while the corresponding potential in response to reinforcement 
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cues became less negative over time. Our results show the very same effect – specifically, that 
the FRN grows more negative as trial number increases, i.e. as the task is learned. 
Furthermore, I indicate the novel results that this trial-by-trial shift in the negativity of the 
waveform is gated by salient reinforcement outcomes – specifically, the effect of trial number on 
increased FRN negativities is driven entirely by better-than-expected rewards and worse-than-
expected aversive outcomes (most salient outcomes). This suggests that the FRN should 
become more negative as trial number increases following salience PEs – which is not in line 
with the interpretation of the FRN as a “reward positivity.” Indeed, it is notable that more recent 
studies of differences in dopaminergic projections have shown that only mesolimbic DA 
projections carry reward signals. Additionally, recent animal neurobiology results have shown 
that mesocortical DA projections carry primarily aversive PEs, while some mesocortical DA 
neurons carry salience information. Our results are in line with the interpretation of the FRN as 
primarily responsive to salient outcomes (better-than-expected rewards and worse-than-
expected outcomes), as well as meeting basic predictions that the FRN should scale with 
learning over time (and replicating Krigolson et al., 2014 who demonstrated that the FRN grows 
more negative over time). Put another way, the FRN rapidly becomes more negative as task 
contingencies are learned. A Pearce-Hall salience signal (Pearce & Hall, 1980) is often referred 
to as a “learning rate,” suggesting that learning should increase with more salient outcomes. 
Since the FRN becomes more negative with learning, it is no surprise that the impact of trial 
number on the FRN is only significant for the most salient outcomes (reflecting increased 
learning following more salient, compared to less salient, outcomes). Specifically, the FRN 
becomes more negative over the course of the task, which reflects a learning effect, but this 
learning effect is most pronounced following salient outcomes, in line with the notion that the 
FRN reflects a Pearce-Hall salience PE. This can be viewed in light of the hypothesis that the 
FRN is impacted by a dopaminergic salience signal. As task outcomes are learned over the 
course of time, dopamine release dwindles. That is, dopamine release is expected to decrease 
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proportionally to how well or thoroughly an organism learns the requirements of a task. Since 
dopamine primarily reflects a learning signal, dopamine release is increased when the organism 
needs to learn task constraints but will decrease over time as task constraints are cemented 
behaviorally (the organism no longer needs to learn, as it already knows how to complete the 
task). Thus, as the organism learns and dopamine release dwindles, FRN amplitudes increase. 
Finally, our interpretation of the FRN as a reinforcement learning signal is cemented by our 
single-trial brain-behavior regression results indicating that more negative FRN amplitude 
following worse-than-expected aversive stimulus delivery spurred more adaptive responding in 
the following trial. This provides empirical evidence that negative shifts in the FRN over the 
course of the task following aversive outcomes are indeed predictive of future reinforcement 
learning, rather than merely reflecting habituation. 
4.2.2 Single-Trial Results Part 2: Influence of Trial Number and Prediction Errors on 
Reaction Times 
Many, if not most, studies of the FRN information content are notably without a 
corresponding analysis of behavior evoked during the task. However, in order to fully 
understand the computations the cortex is undergoing during reinforcement processing, 
behavior should also be analyzed. Specifically, there is a large amount of prior evidence, 
primarily from animal studies, that shows definite impacts of reinforcement and dopamine levels 
on the speed of responses (in animal literature referred to as vigor). Bryce and Floresco (2019) 
trained rats in an effort-discounting task where rats chose between low-effort, low-reward 
scenarios and high-effort, high-reward scenarios. They then tested these effects while D2 
receptors in the nucleus accumbens were stimulated. Results indicated that excessive 
stimulation of DA receptors resulted in longer response latencies (reduced response vigor) and 
lower willingness to expend effort to obtain a reward. In interpreting this result it is key to note 
that the nucleus accumbens is targeted by the mesolimbic set of DA projections, and therefore 
carries primarily reward information – as the authors perfused NAcc with DA, this likely resulted 
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in the rats already feeling a sense of subjective reward that would be expected to lower 
response vigor (slower RTs) in the pursuit of additional reward. Our results for the outcome-
related shift of reaction times were confined to negative reinforcement and indicated that 
following better-than-expected outcomes participants were slower in their next responses, but 
that participants increased reaction speed following unexpectedly large punishments. This is 
well in line with Bryce and Floresco’s (2019) study, which indicated that following DA perfusion 
in NAcc, rats were already satiated and did not pursue rewards as readily. We interpret our 
results indicating that participants slowed responses following better-than-expected negative 
reinforcement outcomes in light of the aforementioned results and suggest that following better-
than-expected negative reinforcement outcomes, our participants were already “satiated” and 
had less motivation to respond quickly.  
Bryce and Floresco (2016) indicated that this tradeoff between effort and reward seeking 
was altered by infusion of a stress factor (corticotropin-releasing factor; Bryce & Floresco 2016). 
This indicated that infusion of a stress agonist reduced the willingness of animals to pursue 
high-effort options. While this might seem at odds with our results for reaction times in negative 
reinforcement (in which responses became faster following aversive outcomes) it is important to 
note that there was no aversive learning occurring in the aforementioned animal study since 
CRH was administered by the investigator. I instead suggest that when the opportunity to 
escape further punishments is made possible by responding more quickly (as in our task), the 
expected reinforcing effects of aversive stimulus delivery are seen – that is, in an effort to avoid 
further aversive stimuli, humans increase response speed following punishment. 
Niv, Daw, Joel, & Dayan (2007) extend reinforcement learning models to operant tasks, 
and indicate that tonic levels of DA shift the willingness of an agent to engage in more effortful 
behavior. Specifically, results indicate that higher tonic levels of DA facilitate slower but more 
exploratory responding. Our examination of RTs following positive reinforcement, where 
participants were given a graded level of reward on every trial, support the model by Niv et al. 
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(2007). As the average reward was learned, and indeed as participants learned that positive 
reinforcement correct feedback would never be followed by an omission of reward or a loss, 
tonic levels of DA would be required by neurobiological theories to decrease, facilitating 
monotonic effects of increased reaction speeds over the course of the task as we demonstrate 
(main effect of trial number on single-trial RTs for positive reinforcement). This particular 
hypothesized tonic effect was reflected in neural activity following rewarding outcomes, as we 
demonstrate that the FRN becomes more negative over time following better-than-expected 
rewards. Interpreting the FRN through theories suggesting it is influenced by release of 
dopamine in cortex, this potential would be expected to grow more negative over time as 
dopamine release in cortex decreases. We found precisely this effect using single-trial analysis. 
While the previous mentioned study was a theoretical model, this result was empirically 
demonstrated in a human sample by Guitart-Masip, Beierholm, Dolan, Duzel, & Dayan (2011), 
who indicated that the average reaction time was partially explained by the average rate of 
reward in a task, which changed slowly but systematically. This study did not examine the 
influence of immediate reward on RTs as our study did, but I also note that in positive 
reinforcement conditions I found null effects of immediate reward but instead only a tonic effect 
where reaction time speeded as trial number increased. This is in line with the findings of 
Guitart-Masip et al., and indicates that as subjects learned the average rate of reward in the 
task their responses became faster.  
In a novel study of changes in human reaction times combined with fMRI scanning, 
Evers, Stiers, and Ramaekers (2017) probed the effect of tonic and phasic shifts in DA on RT. 
Notably, this study indicated that tonic DA levels in striatum indicate an average reward signal, 
and predicted faster RTs. Meanwhile, tonic shifts in DA decreased the striatal response to gains 
and losses in a task (phasic shifts in DA). This is in line with our positive reinforcement results 
for RTs, suggesting that reduced phasic DA release as rewards are learned facilitates faster 
and less exploratory responding. The present study appears to be the first attempt to extend the 
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analysis of reinforcement-modulated reaction time learning to negative reinforcement 
conditions, and therefore it remains to be seen what this effect might look like in an animal 
model, or indeed in a standard reinforcement learning task. However, taken together, the 
aforementioned results show that reaction time shifts to faster responding as task outcomes and 
contingencies are learned. This result fits well with our results indicating faster responding and 
greater learning immediately following aversive negative reinforcement outcomes, which is in 
line with theories holding that organisms must learn from negative outcomes to avoid those 
same outcomes in the future. 
4.3 Limitations of the Current Study 
While the study described in this manuscript remedies many shortcomings and 
confounds of previous studies of the FRN, it is not without limitations. Perhaps the most limiting 
factor of this study is the novel design of the task, which means that replication of this study 
design and of these effects are necessary before strong conclusions can be drawn from this 
study. Furthermore, the inspiration for this study comes primarily from invasive animal research 
examining dopamine neurobiology. While our results are largely in line with what must be 
expected of dopaminergic activity in cortex, we are not able to make any claims that the 
observed effects are rooted in dopamine neurotransmission. It is possible that these effects are 
not tied to dopamine neurotransmission at all but are instead the result of endogenous 
computations undertaken completely in the cortex (Cavanagh & Frank, 2014; Cavanagh, 
Zambrano-Vazquez, & Allen, 2012). Since serotonergic neurons were also recently 
demonstrated to compute salience PEs (Matias, Lottem, Dugue, & Mainen, 2017), it is even 
possible that the observed brain potential effects are conveyed to cortex from neurons in the 
raphe nucleus. However, previous examinations of the FRN have repeatedly suggested that this 
potential is the result of cortical dopamine release, and so we interpret our results through this 
existing theoretical lens while incorporating more recent neurobiological examinations that were 
not known when the RL-FRN hypothesis was formulated. Finally, while our result controls for 
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the influence of error monitoring, it is still possible given the task design that the FRN is primarily 
responsive only to the valence of outcomes, and not to PEs. That is, the observed effects for 
negative reinforcement might be due simply to the fact that these outcomes were either gains or 
losses, while in positive reinforcement all outcomes were gains. However, under an axiomatic 
definition of a PE as merely reflecting a deviation from expected outcomes, the actual valence 
(gain or loss of points) should not be a determining factor. That is, a signed PE is decoupled 
from the valence of the outcome itself, and merely reflects whether the outcome was better or 
worse than expected, so this should not be a problem for the described study. 
4.4 Conclusion 
The present study utilized a unique manipulation to separate the influence of error and 
performance monitoring from the influence of worse- or better-than-expected outcome signaling. 
Previous studies using Skinnerian definitions of positive reinforcement (rewards are either 
delivered or omitted) have demonstrated that the FRN is more negative following omitted 
rewards than delivered rewards. However, previous studies have also largely confounded the 
influences of error monitoring in an effort to understand whether the FRN reflects a signed PE. 
In a task design that decouples the influence of error monitoring from outcome processing, we 
do not find any influence of worse-than-expected outcomes compared to better-than-expected 
outcomes in positive reinforcement conditions. This is in line with more recent animal 
neurobiology results, indicating that the mesocortical dopamine pathway carries primarily 
information about aversive salience rather than reward information (which is mostly localized 
along the mesolimbic dopamine pathway). In this controlled design, we still found the expected 
effect for negative reinforcement that better-than-expected outcomes resulted in greater 
mediofrontal negativity (FRNs; suggesting less mesocortical DA activity) compared to worse-
than-expected outcomes (suggesting more mesocortical DA activity). This is in line with 
neurobiological evidence that dopamine neurons projecting to cortex appear to increase firing 
rate following aversive stimuli, which by existing theories should inhibit the FRN (less negative 
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activation). If the FRN signaled value PEs, the effect we found (FRN is more negative following 
better-than-expected rather than worse-than-expected negative reinforcement outcomes) would 
necessarily have to be reversed. More specifically, if the FRN was sensitive to value PEs it 
would be more inhibited by DA activation for better-than-expected outcomes (rather than more 
inhibited for worse-than-expected outcomes). As dopamine neurons projecting to the cortex are 
known to become excited by aversive stimulus delivery, this might still be in line with Holroyd & 
Coles (2002) original notion that dopamine inhibits the apical dendrites of cortical pyramidal 
neurons. 
In a single-trial analysis of the FRN, we replicate previous evidence that the FRN grows 
more negative over time as task conditions are learned. This corresponds to a hypothesized 
decrease over time in dopamine levels in cortex, which by existing theories should disinhibit 
cortical pyramidal cells. Notably, we extended these results by showing that this change over 
time is only evident following salient outcomes, which according to extant theories are the 
outcomes that are most valuable to learn from. We showed that the FRN grows more negative 
over time following better-than-expected rewards and worse-than-expected aversive stimulus 
delivery, which are the most salient outcomes delivered in the task and therefore the most 
critical outcomes for a subject to learn from. We verify that this is indeed an effect of task 
learning, rather than an effect of mere habituation, by showing that following negative 
reinforcement worse-than-expected outcomes, more negative FRN amplitudes drive faster 
responding on the next consecutive trial. Taken together, our trial-averaged and single-trial 
analysis of the FRN indicates that the FRN is most sensitive to aversive outcomes and drives 
behavioral learning effects following aversive outcomes as well. This represents an important 
challenge to the dominant RL-FRN theory and provides neurobiologically-inspired evidence 
against the interpretation of the mesocortical dopamine tract as carrying a signed PE to 
mediofrontal cortex. 
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